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Abstract: The network may be the technological metaphor of the present era.  A 
network, consisting of “nodes” and “links,” may be a group of individuals linked by 
friendship; a group of computers linked by network cables; a system of roads or airline 
flights -- or another of a virtually limitless variety of systems of connected “things.”  The 
past few years have seen an explosion of interest in “network science” in fields from 
physics to sociology.  Network science highlights the role of relationship patterns in 
determining collective behavior.  It underscores and begins to address the difficulty of 
predicting collective behavior from individual interactions.  This Article seeks first to 
describe how network science can provide new conceptual and empirical approaches to 
legal questions because of its focus on analyzing the effects of patterns of relationship.
Second, the Article illustrates the network approach by describing a study of the 
network created by patents and the citations between them.  Burgeoning patenting has 
raised concerns about patent quality, reflected in proposed legislation and in renewed 
Supreme Court attention to patent law.  The network approach allows us to get behind the 
increasing numbers and investigate the relationships between patented technologies.  We 
distinguish between faster technological progress, increasing breadth of patented 
technologies, and a lower patentability standard as possible explanations for increased 
patenting. Our analysis suggests that increasing pace and breadth of innovation alone are 
unlikely to explain the recent evolution of the patent citation network.  Since the early 
1990s the disparity in likelihood of citation between the most “citable” and least “citable” 
patents has grown, suggesting that patents may be being issued for increasingly trivial 
advances.  The timing of the increasing stratification is correlated with increasing 
reliance by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the widely criticized “motivation or 
suggestion to combine” test for nonobviousness, although we cannot rule out other 
explanations.  The final part of the Article describes how network analysis may be used 
to address other issues in patent law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The network seems to be the technological metaphor of the present era.  Our 
fascination with networks is no doubt motivated in large part by the Internet, which not 
only ties us together technologically in ways that were not previously possible, but leads 
us to conceptualize the world in a more relational way.1  Once one picks up this 
conceptual lens, networks are everywhere.  A network, consisting of “nodes” and “links,” 
may be a group of individuals linked by friendship or commerce; a group of computers 
linked by network cables; a nervous system; a system of roads or airline flights; a 
collection of cracks in the earth; a group of patents and the citations between them -- or 
another of a virtually limitless variety of systems of connected “things.” 
Consistent with the increased salience of the network concept, the past few years 
have seen an explosion of interest in “network science.”  Natural and social scientists in 
fields from physics to sociology to biology have seized upon networks as important 
analytical and explanatory tools.2  Popular books and articles discuss the extent to which 
people, places, and things are “Linked”3 or separated by only “Six Degrees.”4  Prominent 
1 See DARIN BARNEY, THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2004) for a critique of the ubiquitous application of the 
network metaphor to modern society.
2 See, for overview discussions, e.g., Reka Albert and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Statistical Mechanics of 
Complex Networks, 74 REV. MOD. PHYS. 47 (2002); ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); S. N. DOROGOVTSEV AND J. F. F. MENDES, EVOLUTION OF NETWORKS 
FROM BIOLOGICAL NETS TO THE INTERNET AND WWW (2003); M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and 
Function of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM Rev. 167-256 (2003); ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS AND 
ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET : A STATISTICAL PHYSICS 
APPROACH (2004); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2002); PETER J. 
CARRINGTON, JOHN SCOTT AND STANLEY WASSERMAN, MODELS AND METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS (2005).
3 BARABASI, supra note 2.
4 WATTS, supra note 2.
5universities have inaugurated inter-disciplinary centers and programs relating to the study 
of networks.5  Most recently, a few legal scholars have begun to apply some of the 
techniques and insights of network science to the empirical and theoretical study of law.6
This Article seeks to accomplish two things with respect to the application of 
network science to the study of law.  First, it seeks to persuade readers that legal scholars 
should jump on the network bandwagon in greater numbers because of the important 
conceptual advances and analytical tools that network science provides.  Specifically, 
network science highlights the potential importance of heterogeneity and local 
relationship patterns in determining collective behavior.  It also underscores and begins to 
address the difficulty of predicting collective behavior from individual interactions or 
transactions.  As the science of networks continues to develop, it promises to provide 
5 See, e.g., The University of Illinois “Age of Networks” program, at 
http://www.cas.uiuc.edu/networks.html; Cornell University’s Institute for the Social Sciences Theme 
Project 2005-08, “Getting Connected: Social Science in the Age of Networks,” at 
http://www.socialsciences.cornell.edu/0508/networks_desc.html; and Northwestern University’s Institute 
on Complex Systems, at http://www.northwestern.edu/nico.
6
 The application of network science to law is in its infancy.  While many law review articles deal with the 
topic of network effects or discuss the Internet and other networked infrastructure, the paucity of articles 
applying network science or modeling from a statistical physics, computer science, or social network 
theory perspective is evident.  For example, a LEXIS search for law review articles citing either of the 
authors of the most well-known popular works on network science (BARABASI, supra note 2 or WATTS, 
supra note 2), uncovers only about ten articles making more than a passing reference to network science.  
Yet even this small group demonstrates the breadth of potential applications of network science to legal 
scholarship.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres and Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 599 (2005); Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations As Cities: Targeting the Nodes in Overlapping 
Networks, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 533 (2004); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network 
Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 493 (2004); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005); Lawrence Mitchell, 
Structural Holes, CEOs and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1313 (2005); Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of 
Networks as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 493 (2005).  We are also 
aware of related work by Thomas A.C. Smith, The Web of Law, San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 06-11, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=642863 (Spring 2005); Seth J. Chandler, The Network 
Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, University of Houston Law Center No. 2005-W-01, available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=742065 (June 10, 2005); Tracey L. Meares and Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 
or 3 Come Together, U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 107, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=835664 (October 2005); and Gavin Clarkson (abstract to be presented at 
Symposium on Law in the Age of Networks: Implications of Network Science for Legal Analysis, March 10, 
2005, available at http://www.cas.uiuc.edu/networkslaw.html).
6both new approaches to the analysis of empirical data and new tools for modeling the 
expected results of legal change.  These analytical approaches and modeling tools 
complement the existing empirical methods and theoretical models of law and economics 
and other interdisciplinary approaches.  Part II of this Article examines the general 
potential for network science to contribute to legal analysis.
Second, in Parts III and IV, the Article illustrates the application of a network 
approach to empirical data by describing some initial results of a network science study 
of patent citations.7  The overall goal of the study is to gain a better understanding of the 
evolution and structure of technical relationships between patents in the United States 
patent system and to investigate the implications of current patenting behavior for 
innovation policy and law.  The United States patent system has been the subject of 
increasing criticism in recent years.8   There is a perception that recently issued patents 
sweep more broadly than justified by their inventors’ contributions or protect inventions 
that should be deemed obvious.  Critics also contend that patents increasingly impose 
transaction costs on areas, such as scientific research, software, and business methods, in 
which they may not be needed to promote technological advances. These criticisms are 
7
 Because our training is in statistical physics, we focus throughout this Article on the statistical physics 
approach to network theory.  This is not to suggest that this approach is superior to other approaches to 
network science for purposes of legal analysis.  Indeed, one would anticipate that the social network theory 
devised by sociologists should provide similar, or even more relevant, insights in many cases.  Moreover, 
these approaches have much in common.
8 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, Report (October 2003) and references therein; Stephen A. Merrill,, Richard C. 
Levin, and Mark B. Myers, eds., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES (2004) and references therein; Michael Heller and Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698-
701 (May 1998); ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 
Princeton University Press (2004) and references therein; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: 
The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (critiquing the Jaffe and Lerner book 
for its emphasis on patent invalidity and pointing out other potential sources of problems with the patent 
system).
7reflected in recently proposed legislation9 and in renewed Supreme Court attention to 
patent law.10  Responses to the criticism, most recently from USPTO Director Jon Dudas, 
highlight the contributions of intellectual property to the nation’s economy and argue that 
increasing numbers of patents do not necessarily signify an erosion of patent quality.11
Part III of this Article employs a network science approach to understanding the 
burgeoning patenting of the past few decades.12  In our study the “nodes” of the network 
are United States patents and the “links” are citations of one patent by another.13  Patent 
citations indicate technological relationships between the patented technologies.  For the 
most part, a citation from one patent to another indicates either that the later patent builds 
upon the technology of the earlier patent or that the claimed inventions are closely 
enough related that the earlier technology was material to determining whether the later 
patent should be issued.  The citation network thus provides a kind of “map” of the 
relationships between patented technologies.  
We have performed a detailed study of the evolution of the patent citation 
network since 1975.  In looking at how the network structure has evolved, we distinguish 
9 See H.R. 2795, Patent Reform Act of 2005.
10 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. 
Swift Eckrich, Inc., Supreme Court No. 04-597 (argued Nov. 2, 2005); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc., Supreme Court No. 04-1329 (argued Nov. 29, 2005); Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Supreme Court No. 04-607 (cert granted Oct. 31, 2005); eBay, 
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, Supreme Court No. 05-130 (cert granted Nov. 28, 2005).  See also Marcia 
Coyle, Justices Ponder Heavy Patent Docket: David vs. Goliath Case One of Many Patent Disputes Before 
Supreme Court, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (December 12, 2005), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1134122713321 (arguing that increased Supreme Court attention to 
patent law is due to “[a] constellation of factors, according to scholars and litigators, not the least of which 
is unhappiness with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”).
11
 Dudas: Perception Gap Hindering Efforts to Improve Patent System, 71 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK 
AND COPYRIGHT J. 374 (Feb. 10, 2006).
12 Our patent citation study is similar in flavor to recent studies of citations in scientific journal articles, see
S. Redner, Citations Statistics from 110 Years of Physical Review, PHYSICS TODAY 58, 49 (2005), and of 
the “web of law” consisting of cases and other legal authorities and the citations linking them.  See Smith, 
supra note 6 and Chandler, supra note 6.
13
 United States patents also cite scientific literature and foreign patents.  Our data do not include these 
additional links.
8between three possible explanations of the recent increased patenting -- faster 
technological progress; increasing breadth of patented technologies due either to 
expansion of patentable subject matter or to new fields of invention; and a lowering of 
the legal standard for patentability leading to the issuance of patents for more trivial 
innovative steps.  These possibilities are not mutually exclusive, of course.  The question 
we ask here is whether the observed evolution of the patent network can be explained 
solely in terms of an increasing pace and breadth of technological advance or whether 
some additional factor is needed to understand the observed network growth.  
Our analysis leads us to conclude that increasing pace and breadth of innovation 
alone are unlikely to explain the way in which the patent citation network has evolved in 
recent years.  This is primarily because, as we explain in detail in Part III, the citation 
network has undergone a measurable increase in stratification since the early 1990s, 
following a modest decrease during the 1980s.  Here, by “stratification” we mean that 
there is an increasing disparity in likelihood of citation between the most “citable” and 
least “citable” patents.  Because patent citations are linked to the technological 
importance of the patented technology, we argue that this observation supports the 
contention that patents are being issued for increasingly trivial advances.  The timing of 
the increasing stratification that we observe suggests that the lowering of the threshold 
for patenting may be correlated with increasing reliance by the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals on the widely criticized “motivation or suggestion to combine” test for 
nonobviousness,14 which took hold in the early 1990s, although we cannot rule out other 
explanations.  
14 See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES, (hereinafter “MPEP”) § 2143.01; See, e.g., In re 
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The “suggestion test” has its roots much earlier in the 
9Our present results only begin to tap the potential of the network science approach 
to patent citations.  In Part IV of this Article we describe some directions for further 
research and some initial steps in those directions.  First, we describe how the network
concept of path length may be useful in patent classification and in measuring the extent 
to which patented technologies are related.  Numerous patent law doctrines are based on 
the perspective of the “person having ordinary skill in the art” or “PHOSITA.”15  Both 
patent validity and patent infringement are to be determined from this perspective.  In 
addition, the obviousness of a claimed invention is judged in light of prior inventions in 
“analogous arts.”16  Assessing technological relationships is essential to applying these 
doctrines.  
Second, we discuss how network analysis can shed light on the innovative process 
and permit empirical investigation of non-linear theories of how innovation proceeds.  
We discuss the work of several social scientists who have made steps in this direction.  
Our own analysis of network evolution reveals that, while most citations to a patent are 
made relatively soon after it issues, there is a long tail of much later citations even for 
patents that have received few or no previous citations.  This result indicates that even 
“unpopular” patents have a significant chance of re-emerging in importance after long 
periods of quiescence, perhaps signifying how innovation proceeds not only by building 
incrementally on previous advances but also by reaching back to make new use of 
previously neglected technology.  These results cast further doubt on the possibility that 
jurisprudence of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.  See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1][e] for a 
discussion of the history of the test.  However, it took on its modern form and became important at the 
Federal Circuit beginning in the early 1990s.  The percentage of opinions involving nonobviousness citing 
the suggestion test rose from about 10-15% in the late 1980s to about 40-50% in the late 1990s.  (See
Figure 11.)
15 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,  17 B ERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1155 (2002) for a discussion of the importance of the PHOSITA in patent law.
16 See, e.g., In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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valuable innovation can be identified confidently at the time of patenting.17  Next, we 
describe how network science provides local relational metrics that may be of use in 
exploring the extent to which closely related patented technologies are complements or 
substitutes, an issue of relevance to the problem of “patent thickets” and to issues of anti-
competitiveness in patent licensing.  Finally, we note how a network perspective may be 
helpful in understanding citation practice itself, highlighting some unexplained 
observations about the number of citations that patents make.
Part V offers conclusions.  It is our hope that the specific application of network 
science to the patent citation network will buttress the broader point that network theory 
and modeling, as they are applied in statistical physics and, relatedly, in social network 
analysis, computer science, and elsewhere, have great potential to complement other 
interdisciplinary approaches to the analysis of present and proposed legal doctrine.
II. NETWORK SCIENCE:  WHAT IT IS AND WHY LEGAL SCHOLARS 
SHOULD CARE
II.A. What Network Science Is 
Network science, whether it arises in the social sciences, in computer science, or 
in the natural sciences such as physics or biology, has three general, interrelated goals:  1) 
to measure, describe, and categorize network structure and the patterns of relationships 
between network nodes; 2) to understand network evolution and growth and its 
relationship to network structure; and 3) to understand how the collective behavior of 
entities connected in a network depends on and derives from the network’s structure.  All 
three aspects of this project are ongoing in network science and many open questions 
17
 See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore and R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable 
Patents, 92 GEORGETOWN L.J. 435 (2004), arguing for metrics to identify valuable patents; David E. 
Adelman and Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Mapping the Scientific Commons:
Biotechnology Patenting from 1990 to 2004 (work in progress) (critiquing the approach of Allison et al.).
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exist at all three levels.  The overall intuition behind the interdisciplinary conversations 
that characterize the emerging field of “network science” is that, at some level of 
abstraction, common structures, growth patterns, and collective behaviors will arise in 
networks composed of very different kinds of elements and linkages.  Since this is the 
case, common concepts and methods will be useful in understanding widely varying 
networks and in answering the very different substantive questions posed by physicists, 
biologists, computer scientists, sociologists and, most recently, by legal scholars.
II.A.1 Characterizing the Comparable Structure of Diverse Networks
Network science seeks at the outset to measure and describe various relational 
structures that are found in the social or physical world.  In a network in which the node 
is an individual, the links might be relationships of friendship, kinship, sexual 
involvement, business association and so forth.  When the node is an airport, the links 
might be flight paths.  When the node is a business entity, the links might be supply and 
distribution relationships.  And when the node is a patent, scientific journal, or legal 
opinion, the links can be citations.  
The descriptive task of network science necessitates thinking about what 
quantities characterize networks -- what metrics provide parsimonious, yet illuminating, 
means of describing and comparing relational structures.  It aims at more than simply 
providing a means to parameterize individual network structures.  Part of the fascination 
of network science is that similar metrics -- degree distribution, “transitivity,” network 
“path lengths,” and others -- may be used to describe networks of very different “nodes” 
and “links.”18  Strikingly similar results are obtained for some of these metrics when 
seemingly disparate networks are measured.  The broader descriptive goal is to delineate 
18 See, e.g., references supra note 2.
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the similarities and differences between networks with the hope that these structures can 
be categorized in some logical way that can provide substantive insights into the 
underlying systems.  
II.A.1.a Not Your Average Node:  “Scale Free” Degree Distributions
For example, the “degree” of a node is defined as the number of connections or 
“links” it has to other nodes.  Node degree is an intuitive measure of “importance,” 
though the meaning of such importance will be very different in a network of friends than 
it is in a network of legal citations.  One way to characterize a network is to study the 
“node degree distribution.”  The node degree distribution charts how often, in the given 
network, a node is found that has a particular number of connections or “degree.”  (See 
Figure 1, which plots the node degree distribution for the patent citation network, for an 
example.)
If a network is produced by randomly connecting nodes to one another with a 
uniform probability of connection, the degree distribution will be symmetrically peaked 
around a “typical” number of edges determined by that probability of connection.  (See 
Figure 2.)  For large networks, the peak will be very narrow, so that most nodes will have 
the “typical” number of edges or close to it.  In this sense, the nodes of a random network 
can be said to be relatively homogeneous.  In the random network underlying Figure 2, 
for example, the most common number of connections for a node is twenty -- and this is 
also the average and median number.  Though there are plenty of nodes with ten to thirty 
connections, once one gets much outside the peak width, the numbers drop drastically.  
There are virtually no nodes with 100 connections.  
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The symmetrical, peaked distribution of Figure 2 is similar to the “normal” 
distribution or “Bell curve” that characterizes the probability distribution of many things 
in our everyday experience19 -- such as the height of human beings, for example.  (See 
Figure 3 for an example of a normal distribution.)  The fact that the height of human 
beings has this kind of “normal” probability distribution makes it possible to design 
furniture, showers, cars, and the like for the “average” person and to expect that nearly all 
people will be able to use them, perhaps with minor adjustments.
One of the first -- and still one of the most interesting -- results of network science 
was the discovery that many networks encountered in the real world are not at all like the 
random networks with degree distributions as illustrated in Figure 2.  They are not 
homogeneous.  Indeed, the degree distributions of many real world networks look 
nothing like a normal distribution.  Instead, these degree distributions are very broad, 
with what are called “fat tails,” and highly skewed.  (See Figure 1.)  In these networks, 
rather than all nodes having roughly the same “typical” number of links, there are a large 
number of nodes with very few links, but there are also a small, but significant, number 
of nodes with very many links.  These highly connected nodes may have hundreds or 
thousands of times as many connections as the “average” or “typical” node.  Depending 
upon the network, the few highly connected nodes may play a much more important role 
than the large number of minimally connected nodes.  For example, in a communications 
network, the system might continue to operate despite failures of many “typical” nodes, 
but be completely defeated by the failure of one highly connected node.  Any attempt to 
19
 The probability distribution for the node degree of a random graph is not precisely a normal or 
“Gaussian” distribution.  Mathematically, it  takes another typical form for probability distributions -- the 
Poisson distribution.  See Newman, supra note 2 at 9.  For present purposes, the difference is unimportant.  
What is important is the peaked, symmetrical shape.
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understand the collective behavior of such a network that focuses on the “typical” node is 
doomed to failure.  
When the degree distribution is sufficiently broad, it will have a “power law” 
decaying tail.  In some cases, network degree distributions may be so broad that they do 
not even have well-defined averages or “widths.”  Figure 4 illustrates a “power law” 
degree distribution, meaning that the fraction of nodes with a particular number of 
connections decays like d- once d is large (where d is the degree of a node).  Figure 4 
shows how, the smaller the decay power  becomes, the more difficult it becomes to 
identify a “typical” node.  When  is 3, the most likely number of connections is 0, while 
the median number is about 15 and the average number is about 20.  When   is even 
smaller, the most likely number of connections is still 0, but the median number is 40 and 
the average is essentially infinite because there are so many nodes with very large 
numbers of connections.  The likelihood of having a particular number of connections for 
 = 1.5 is fairly flat and it would be a mistake to say that a node with 10 , 40, or 100 
connections is “typical.”
Because there is no “typical” number of links for a node in a power law 
distribution, such networks are often termed “scale free,” meaning roughly that there is 
no typical “scale” that is useful to describe the network.  In such a “scale free” situation, 
knowing, for example, that the average number of links per node is 12 is not useful 
because there are significant numbers of nodes with no links and significant numbers of 
nodes with hundreds or thousands of links.20  Decisions, plans, or predictions based on 
20
 More precisely, a “scale free” network is one in which the large degree tail of the node degree 
distribution decays as a power of the degree, P(k) ~ k-a , rather than exponentially with the degree, as more 
well known probability distributions do.  Technically, the term “scale free” should be reserved for networks 
15
the “average” node degree may be doomed to failure.  An example of this kind of 
situation is the attempt to estimate the spread of a virus, such as HIV.  While the average 
number of sexual partners per person may be quite small, if, as appears to be the case, the 
distribution is sufficiently broad (effectively scale free), there are a small but significant 
number of individuals who have hundreds of sexual partners.21  Any predictions of how 
fast the virus will spread based on the “average” number of sexual partners will be 
completely wrong.22
Highly skewed and broad degree distributions are common in networks of widely 
varying types, including the physical connections and hardware of the Internet; the 
hyperlinks of the World Wide Web; the networks of co-authorship of high energy physics 
papers and of co-appearances of movie actors; networks of sexual contacts; metabolic 
networks; phone call networks; networks of word uses; protein interaction networks; and 
many others.23  Other observed networks, such as the power grid, do not have a scale free 
or nearly scale free form, however.  The degree distribution is thus a metric which can be 
used to categorize networks and to differentiate between them with respect to how they 
may behave.
II.A.1.b  Six Degrees of Separation:  The “Small World” Property
Another commonly observed attribute of real world networks is the “small world” 
property, in which a relatively small number of “hops” between nodes is needed to 
connect any two nodes in the network.24  The small world property can be important in 
in which the node degree distribution has a power law decay.  In reality, it is sometimes difficult to tell a 
true “power law” decay from a very broad, skewed distribution with an exponentially decaying tail.
21
 Ayres and Baker, supra note 6 at 607-11.
22 Id.
23 See Albert and Barabasi, supra note 2 and Newman, supra note 2.
24 Id.
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determining the rate at which something -- which might be a fad, a piece of information, 
or a deadly virus -- spreads across the network.  The small world property is often related 
to the presence of highly connected “hubs” in the network, which connect otherwise 
widely separated nodes (as in the sexual contact example already mentioned).  But this is 
not necessarily the case.  A random network with a degree distribution like that shown in 
Figure 2 can have the small world property, as can a regular network (think of a fishnet, 
for example), after a small amount of “re-wiring” to connect distant parts of the 
network.25  The presence or absence of the small world property is thus an additional 
metric which may be used to categorize observed networks.
II.A.2 How Does Your Network Grow?  “Preferential Attachment” and Other 
Factors in Network Evolution
Degree distributions, small world properties and other measures are useful in 
describing and categorizing real world networks.  The aim of this descriptive task is not 
simply the “gee-whiz” satisfaction of seeing similar graphs show up for widely differing 
networks (though physicists, at least, do derive an inordinate amount of pleasure from 
such observations of “universality”).  The underlying intuition driving the descriptive 
enterprise is that similar structures probably result from similar mechanisms of network 
growth and evolution and that networks with similar structures will behave in similar 
ways.  Making the connection between the mechanisms by which a network evolved and 
its eventual structure is the second task of network science.
25 See Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of Small World Networks, 393 
NATURE 440 (1998) for discussions of the basic properties of small world networks.  The term “small 
world” is used in two slightly different senses: to denote the property of short “distance” between nodes 
and to denote that property joined with the additional element of local clustering (more technically, high 
“transitivity”).  We discuss transitivity below at note 109 and associated text, but by the “small world 
property” here we will mean short “distances” between nodes.  By short, we mean, technically, that the 
longest distance between two nodes grows only logarithmically with the number of nodes.  Intuitively, this 
means that it is impossible to make a spatial “map” of the network in which nodes that are connected to one 
another are near to one another.  You will always end up with some connections between “far apart” nodes.
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For example, in many cases (though not always) a “scale free” degree distribution 
results from what is called the “preferential attachment” mechanism.26  “Preferential 
attachment” (also sometimes called the “rich get richer” effect) describes a process for 
creating a network in which “popular” nodes, which already have many links, are more 
likely than others to gain additional links as nodes are added to the network.  Preferential 
attachment can lead to a highly heterogeneous, scale-free, degree distribution in which 
some nodes eventually acquire a very large number of links while others remain 
relatively unconnected.  
Why does this happen?  The underlying reasons vary from network to network --
in a social network popular people attract friends; on the world wide web popular sites 
garner more links; in transportation networks “all roads lead to Rome;” in scientific 
journal citation networks seminal papers are increasingly cited; and so forth.  There are 
two different kinds of reasons that the highly linked garner more links.  They may be 
inherently superior to other nodes --more sociable or nicer people, more useful websites -
- or the very fact that they are highly linked may make them more “linkable” -- it is 
useful to fly through Chicago’s O’Hare airport because so many other connecting flights 
already do.  Once the concept of preferential attachment has been identified, it can 
provide insights into the growth of many different kinds of networks.  While the 
particular reasons that well-connected nodes acquire additional links certainly vary from 
network to network, the general phenomenon of preferential attachment is widespread.  
Though preferential attachment is common, in many real situations it is curtailed 
by cost or congestion.  The capacity of a power hub limits the number of substations to 
which it can connect; the capacity of an airport limits the number of flights it can handle; 
26 Id.
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popular people may run out of time or otherwise wish to limit their numbers of friends.  
Measuring the degree distribution of a network can thus lead to insights into how the 
network evolved.  If the network is scale-free or very broad, one may search for some 
mechanism for preferential attachment.  Similarly if the degree distribution cuts off at 
high degree, a hunt for a congestion or cost mechanism may be warranted.
Citation networks, such as the patent network discussed in Part III of this Article 
or a network of scientific journal citations, tend to have very similar degree distributions, 
which are broad and skewed, but differ from the pure power law scale free form.  Figure 
1 shows the distribution of number of citations received for the patent citation network at 
different times.  It is quite broad -- there are many patents that have never been cited, but 
others that have received nearly 1000 citations.  To look for possible scale-free behavior, 
we plot the distribution function on a “log-log” graph.  On such a graph, a power-law 
decay would show up as a downward sloping straight line.  (This is illustrated in Figure 4 
at the bottom, which shows the power law distributions on a log-log graph.)  The patent 
citation distribution is clearly quite broad and skewed, but the tail of the distribution is 
not quite a straight line on the graph.  Instead it curves downward, cutting off the 
probability of finding a patent that has received an extremely high number of citations.  
While the precise mathematical form of these citation network distributions is not 
completely understood, our results -- discussed in more detail in Part III -- and those of 
others27 suggest that the shape reflects a competition between preferential attachment --
which leads to some patents acquiring very large numbers of citations -- and the rate at 
27 See, e.g., S. N. Dorogovtsev and J. F. F. Mendes, Evolution of Networks with Aging of Sites, 62 PHYS. 
REV. E 1842-1845 (2000); Han Zhu, Xinran Wang, and Jian-Yang Zhu, Effect of Aging on Network 
Structure, 68 PHYS. REV. E 056121 (2003).
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which patents age or “go out of date.”  The preferential attachment leads to a broad, 
skewed distribution, while the aging of nodes slows their accumulation of citations and 
“cuts off” the tail of the degree distribution.  If a similar distribution is observed in some 
new network, it will be reasonable to predict that that the growth of that network involved 
some mechanism for preferential attachment and for aging.  
Eventually, as more networks are characterized using a variety of metrics, it may 
be possible to infer much about the means by which a particular network evolved (or is 
evolving) by measuring aspects of its current structure.  It may conversely be possible to 
predict many aspects of the network structure that will result from particular linkage 
means of network growth.
II.A.3 Network Structure and Collective Behavior
The third task of network science is to understand the kinds of collective behavior 
that may emerge when elements of a network interact with one another and how the 
resulting behavior may depend upon the structure of the network.  For example, the flow 
of information (or the progress of an epidemic) within a social group, the flow of oil 
through the ground, the susceptibility of an electrical or communication grid to the failure 
of individual elements, the cost of licensing the necessary patents to commercialize a 
particular technology, and the propagation and acceptance of a changing behavioral norm 
may all depend on the relational structure of an underlying network.28  Network science 
will attempt to delineate and interpret the common features of network structures and 
interactions between “nodes” that result in particular varieties of collective responses.  
Such understandings may eventually be used to predict the collective effects of changes 
28 See BARABASI, supra note 2, WATTS, supra note 2 and MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT
(2000) for examples of situations in which the local structure of a network can determine the global
behavior.
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in network structure, changes in the interactions between neighboring elements, and 
changing global influences -- including changes in legal rules. 
II.B. Why Legal Scholars Should Care About Network Science
In some sense, legal scholarship, in its descriptive form, is network science --  the 
study of how particular social, commercial, infrastructural, and other kinds of networks 
adapt and react to particular rules of interaction.  More than this, in fact, normative legal 
scholarship, legal policymaking, statutory legislation, and common law jurisprudence are 
in some respects network engineering -- attempts to produce particular collective social 
responses by adjusting the interactions and incentives experienced by individual network 
elements.  Of course, this observation is important (and not merely semantic) only if 
thinking about society as a network matters -- only if it tells us something different from 
what we have already gained from our existing conceptual frameworks.  
Though the jury must remain out on this question pending more advances in 
network science and more applications of network science by legal scholars, there are 
good reasons to think that network analysis will matter in this way -- and that it may 
matter a lot.  Here we discuss three inter-related concepts highlighted by network science 
that may have broad impact on legal and policy analysis:  1) heterogeneity; 2) the 
importance of network relational structure; and 3) the complicated relationship between 
local structure and interactions and global, collective behavior.
II.B.1 The Implications of Heterogeneity 
To begin with, much of our legal doctrine and scholarship -- including much law 
and economics analysis -- depends implicitly, but heavily, on assumptions and 
predictions about average or “typical” behavior.  Thus, in legal decision-making we rely 
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on the “reasonable person” and the “person having ordinary skill in the art;” we seek to 
deter the “typical” criminal; and we attempt to avoid confusing the “ordinary consumer.”  
We predict the results of policy changes by considering the rational economic actor (or, 
perhaps, the “boundedly rational” economic actor29).  All of these modes of analysis rely 
on an intuition that amounts to assuming that various traits, propensities, preferences, and 
so forth are distributed according to a more or less “normal” distribution.  In other words, 
we assume that the average behavior is the most typical behavior and that extreme 
deviations from the typical are extremely rare -- and thus generally unimportant.  
This intuition is reasonable for many purposes since many properties are 
distributed according to a normal distribution -- there are no hundred foot tall or one inch 
tall human beings, for example.  However, network science provides us with a warning 
about unquestioning reliance on the typicality assumption.  It points out that there are 
common examples of quantities -- such as the number of links to a node -- that are 
distributed in a highly skewed and very broad manner -- indeed, “scale free” or close to 
it.  While we have always known that such broad, skewed distributions were possible, the 
study of networks, along with their societal ubiquity, brings us face- to-face with the fact 
that, at least in some contexts, highly skewed, scale free or nearly scale free, distributions 
are not only possible, but common.  
As discussed above, if a network is “scale free” or nearly so, it is meaningless to 
talk about a “typical” node because the average node is not the most typical node -- and 
the most important nodes are likely neither average nor typical.  As a result, social 
interventions, including legal rules, which are aimed at the “typical” member of a social 
29 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, ed., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) for an overview of the 
significance of bounded rationality.
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group may be ineffective -- it may be necessary to consider a broad spectrum of 
characteristics to devise a workable rule.  
Thus, the first lesson from network science is that legal analysis should consider 
the possibility of heterogeneity -- in some cases radical heterogeneity -- among network 
elements and environments.  Indeed, once one realizes that a simple and common 
mechanism like preferential attachment in a network can result in radical heterogeneity, it 
is motivation to consider what other commonplace deviations from “typicality” may 
arise.30  Perhaps deviations from the normal distribution are not so “abnormal” after all.  
Currently, there is no complete fundamental understanding of when “scale-free” 
distributions occur.  Intuitively, however, it seems likely that these distributions are 
possible when “scale” is not strongly constrained by some form of cost.31  For example, 
the network of World Wide Web hyperlinks (which is relatively unconstrained by linkage 
costs) is approximately scale-free, whereas the railway system (which is constrained by 
the costs of building additional track “links”) and the power grid (which is constrained by 
the cost of wiring and the loss of energy in transportation) are not.32  Thus, an observation 
of extreme heterogeneity should trigger an inquiry not only into its effects but also into 
30
 The statistical physics interest in scale-free distributions, for example, pre-dates network theory and 
stems from the observation of scale free behavior at phase transitions and in observations of “self-organized 
criticality.”  See, e.g., PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY
(1999); P.C. Hohenberg and B. I. Halperin, Theory of Dynamic Critical Phenomena, 49 REVIEWS OF 
MODERN PHYSICS 435 (1977); HENRIK JELDTOFT JENSEN, SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY: EMERGENT 
COMPLEX BEHAVIOR IN PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, Cambridge Lecture Notes in Physics (No. 
10) (1998); SHANG-KENG MA, MODERN THEORY OF CRITICAL PHENOMENA, Frontiers in Physics (1976); H. 
EUGENE STANLEY, INTRODUCTION TO PHASE TRANSITIONS AND CRITICAL PHENOMENA (1971); H. Eugene 
Stanley, Scaling, Universality, and Renormalization: Three Pillars of Modern Critical Phenomena, 71 
REV. MODERN PHYSICS S358 (1999).
31
 In statistical physics, for example, interest in scale-free phenomena arose in the study of critical 
phenomena.  Critical points occur when energy and entropy balance in such a way that fluctuations on all 
length scales have equal free energy and thus all occur at once.  Away from critical points, fluctuations in 
physical systems have a characteristic scale.  See, e.g., D. SORNETTE, CRITICAL PHENOMENA IN NATURAL 
SCIENCES:  CHAOS, FRACTALS, SELF-ORGANIZATION AND DISORDER:  CONCEPTS AND TOOLS (2d Ed. 2004) 
at 241-42 for a discussion of this point.
32 See Newman, supra note 2 at 13-14. 
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its causes.  It is conceivable, for example, that the well-known highly skewed distribution 
of values of technological innovations is somehow related to a fundamental lack of 
proportionality between research investment and research result.  If this (highly 
speculative) premise were correct, it might have important implications for the use of 
patent law to provide incentives to invest.
II.B.2 The Importance of Local Relational Structure
A second lesson from network science is the importance of network structure in 
determining collective behaviors, such as social norms and behavioral regularities and 
flows of information, influence and other goods.  Legal analysis often conceptualizes 
individual legal actors as responding independently to legal rules in the context of global 
average social forces.33  Network science demonstrates that collective behavior may be 
determined not only by the average impact of global social forces but by the specific 
network structures by which these social forces are mediated.  Social network studies 
demonstrate, for example, that access to information depends on one’s position in the 
network.34  Similarly, statistical physics studies show that a randomly constructed 
network may make a transition from a set of disconnected clusters to a single connected 
network at a particular “critical” density of links.35  Diffusion of anything on a network --
whether it be information, opinion, resources, or infection -- may thus be a complicated 
function of the number and placement of network links.  Depending on the specifics of 
33 This is the general approach of social norm theory, for example.  See Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. 
Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming 2006) for a recent review.
34 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6 at 950-70, and references therein, discussing studies of information 
propagation in social networks.
35
 A scale-free network may or may not experience such a transition depending upon the precise form of the 
degree distribution and other factors.  See Newman, supra note 2 at 38-41. 
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relationships, for example, diffusion of information from one social group to another may 
be rapid or extremely slow.36
Rather than thinking of an individual person or firm as being immersed in an 
average social “ether” of information and influences, therefore, it may sometimes be 
important to take into account the specific local relationships in which particular 
individuals are embedded.  Collective behavior may be affected by those specific 
relationships and influences.  The realization that collective behavior cannot always be 
predicted by a model in which an individual “particle” is subjected to the average 
influence of its fellows was important in statistical physics -- it led to the rejection of 
“mean field theory” and inaugurated the modern study of collective physical 
phenomena.37  The statistical physics approach to network science stems from this 
background understanding, which may be quite important for legal analysis as well.38
II.B.3 The Complicated Influence of Local Relationship Patterns on Collective 
Behavior
Finally, and relatedly, network science recognizes that the global implications of 
particular local relationships are not always obvious from the local relationships in 
isolation.  The point is illustrated by a simple example shown in Figure 5.  Assume that 
each dot represents an individual and that the associated + or - represents the individual’s 
36 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, arguing for a view of privacy that takes into account, based on social 
theory, the likelihood that information will diffuse out of a limited group to which it has been revealed.
37
 In statistical physics, the approximation that an individual atom reacts to the average influence of the 
other atoms is called “mean field theory.”  While mean field theory is very useful in some situations, it is 
particularly bad at explaining “phase transitions” (such as melting and freezing, evaporation, 
magnetization), in which the collective behavior of a system changes from one macroscopic state to 
another.   Part of the reason for the failings of mean field theory is its inability to handle the “scale free” 
correlations between blocks of atoms of widely varying sizes that appear near many phase transitions.  See, 
e.g., Ma, supra note 30 at 34-39, for a brief discussion of mean field theory and its shortcomings in the 
phase transition context.
38 See Newman, supra note 2 and Albert and Barabasi, supra note 2, for discussions of the implications of 
local correlations for network structure.
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yes or no decision about some question.  Also assume that each individual must make a 
decision and prefers, for some reason, to make the opposite decision from his or her 
immediate neighbors.  (This model in physics is known as the “anti-ferromagnetic Ising 
model.”)  If the relationships between individuals form a square pattern, as shown in 
Figure 5 at the top, every pair can be made happy by making opposing decisions, and the 
global arrangement will reflect the optimization of the pairwise interactions.  However, if 
the relationships between individuals form a triangular pattern, as shown in the bottom 
panel of Figure 5, it is simply not possible for everyone to disagree with all of his or her 
neighbors.  Even though there is a preferred arrangement for every pair of neighbors 
(disagreement), the system as a whole will be unable to get to a completely 
“disagreeable” state.  The system will be, in the terminology used by statistical physicists, 
“frustrated.” 39  The best global arrangement is not simply predictable by optimizing the 
relative decisions of each pair.  The collective behavior that results from the different 
relationship patterns is entirely different.    
Figure 5 is just an illustration of the more general point that global behavior 
cannot always be predicted from optimized interactions between pairs or in small groups.  
In the legal context, this insight suggests that focusing only on the efficiency of 
individual transactions between individual legal actors may in some cases lead to 
suboptimal legal policies when these actors are embedded in a network of relationships.  
Yet legal analysis and implementation frequently does focus on such individual 
transactions, either because legal rules are forged in the context of specific disputes or 
39 See, e.g., SORNETTE, supra note 31 at 441-43, for a discussion of this example of frustration.
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because, as a theoretical matter, generalizing beyond these individual transactions is 
difficult.40
Merely recognizing these conceptual points may sometimes be enough to provide 
insight into an important legal question.41  However, the potential usefulness of network 
science to legal analysis extends beyond highlighting these general concepts.  Indeed, the 
observation that important social and economic quantities may be distributed in a highly 
skewed, scale-free manner and the idea that collective behavior may not be accurately 
predictable by focusing either on average global influences or on individual transactions 
are certainly not new.  The approximations of typicality, of average social forces, or of 
the generalizability of pairwise interactions, have been employed as means to reduce the
complexity of the analysis.  
The potential contribution of network science is that it not only highlights these 
conceptual issues, but also promises to provide both ways to determine when they are 
likely to be important and tools to perform more accurate analyses in various contexts.  
These tools may be analytical, such as the introduction of explanatory concepts like 
“preferential attachment” and “small worlds.”  They may be mathematical, as illustrated 
by the analysis of patent citations in Part III of this Article.  Or they may be 
40 For example, applications of game theory to legal theory very frequently focus on analyzing a two-
person or, at most, three-person game and then extrapolate to predictions about collective behavior.  See,
generally, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD et al., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994) and ROBERT COOTER AND 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th Ed. 2003) for examples of applying game theory to legal issues. 
Probably the most famous example of this approach in the law is the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(cited in more than 2000 articles in the LEXIS law review database), which is often used to explain 
problems of collective action and free riding.  But see Tom Ginsburg and Richard H. McAdams, 45 WM 
AND MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004), arguing, in the context of international relations, that the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game is overused in comparison to games involving motives for cooperation.  
41 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6 and Ayres and Baker, supra note 6.
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computational, as exemplified by many social network theory software tools or by the 
computer simulation methods of statistical physics.42
Network science concepts may be used as a basis for critiquing extant or proposed 
legal rules.43  Network science methods may also provide, as we begin to demonstrate in 
Parts III and IV of this Article, means of empirical analysis that can be applied to legally 
significant systems in which heterogeneity and network structure are important.  Network 
science techniques may also be used to model the collective behavior that results from 
particular local interactions and preferences and to predict whether legal changes will 
lead to global behavioral change.  For example, one may begin by postulating particular 
pairwise interactions, such as those embodied in many law and economics game theory 
models.  Network science methods may then be employed to determine the collective 
behavior that results from such pairwise interactions.44  Computer simulations will often 
42 See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, describing social network methodologies; and 
www.insna.org, the website of the International Network for Social Network Analysis, which provides 
descriptions of and links to numerous social network software packages.  See, e.g., http://sip.clarku.edu, 
maintained by Harvey Gould and Jan Tobochnik, for resources and links about simulation methods in 
physics.
43 See, e.g., Ayres and Baker, supra note 6; Strahilevitz, supra note 6; Matwyshyn, supra note 6.
44 While the Prisoner’s Dilemma paints a rather gloomy, non-cooperative view of the social world, 
simulations of iterated prisoner’s dilemmas on networks of various structures with various strategic rules 
are beginning to offer a much more complex and varied view of the possible cooperative and non-
cooperative outcomes of the game.  See, e.g., Guillermo Abramson and Marcelo Kuperman, Social Games 
in a  Social Network, 63 PHYS. REV. E 030901(R) (2001); Beom Jun Kim, Ala Trusina, Petter Holme, 
Petter Minnhagen, Jean S. Chung, and M. Y. Choi, Dynamic Instabilities Induced By Asymmetric 
Influence: Prisoners’ Dilemma Game in Small-World Networks, 66 PHYS. REV. E 021907 (2002); Y. F. 
Lim, Kan Chen and C. Jayaprakash, Scale-Invariant Behavior in a  Spatial Game of Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
65 PHYS. REV. E 026134 (2002); Zhi-Xi Wu, Xin-Jian Xu, Yong Chen, and Ying-Hai Wang, Spatial 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Volunteering in Newman-Watts Small-World Networks, 71 PHYS. REV. E
037103 (2005); Petter Holme, Ala Trusina,  Beom Jun Kim and Petter Minnhagen, Prisoners’ Dilemma in 
Real-World Acquaintance Networks: Spikes and Quasiequilibria induced by the Interplay Between 
Structure and Dynamics, 68 PHYS. REV. E 030901(R) (2003).  Other strategic games are also being 
explored on networks using statistical physics approaches.  See, e.g., Ping-Ping Li, Da-Fang Zheng, and P. 
M. Hui, Dynamics of Opinion Formation in a Small-World Network, arXiv:physics/0510065 v1 (October 
10, 2005); Sitabhra Sinha and Sudeshna Sinha, Robust Emergent Activity in Dynamical Networks, 
arXiv:cond-mat/0510603 v1 (October 22, 2005); J. C. Gonz´alez-Avella, M. G. Cosenza, and K. Tucci, 
Nonequilibrium Transition Induced by Mass Media in a Model for Social Influence, 
arXiv:nlin.AO/0511013 v1 (November 8, 2005).
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be the most feasible approach to such questions and can in principle be devised to 
account for heterogeneous preferences and for various network structures.  
Just as has been done with game theory models, it may well be possible to map 
some problems of legal significance onto models that have already been studied by 
physicists, sociologists, and other network scientists.  And network scientists may be 
motivated by legal problems to perform computer simulation or mathematical studies of 
models derived from those problems.
In sum, network science is an emerging discipline that holds great promise to 
provide insights, tools, and models that will make important contributions to legal 
analysis.  In the next Part we provide a sample of the application of network science to 
law by investigating what the evolution of the patent citation network can tell us about 
how the standard of patentability is changing.
III. NETWORK CLUES TO A DECREASING PATENTABILITY STANDARD 
We now move from the lofty realms of possibility to a specific application of 
network science in the legal arena.  We have performed a quantitative analysis of United 
States patents and their citations, treating the patents as citation “nodes” and citations 
from one patent to another as network “links.”  Our analysis suggests that the “patent 
explosion” of recent years is not completely explained by either a rapidly increasing pace 
of technological advance or a broadened scope of patented technology.  Something 
“more” has happened in the network -- an increasing stratification of patent “citability,” 
by which we mean the probability that a patent with particular characteristics will be 
cited.  In this Part we describe how our network science approach reveals this dynamic 
change and hypothesize that it may have been the result of a decreasing patentability 
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standard.  We distinguish carefully between our empirical results -- which any theory of 
the way in which patents and the citations between them have evolved will need to 
explain -- and our proposed interpretation, which is, of course, open to debate.
III.A. Background
III.A.1 The Patent System and Its Discontents45
Recent years have seen a major upsurge in patenting, an expansion of the range of 
innovations which are eligible for patent protection, and a perception that the United 
States economy relies more and more heavily on knowledge and innovation for its 
success.  (See Figure 6, showing the number of patents issued on linear and semi-log 
scales.)  At the same time, developments in the law, including the establishment of a 
single appellate court -- the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals -- to hear the vast majority 
of patent appeals in the United States, have led to debate as to whether the legal system is 
becoming increasingly “patent-friendly;” whether patents are being issued for lower 
quality innovations; and whether the legal rights awarded to patentees are becoming 
stronger.46  Along with empirical evidence that increasingly raises questions as to the 
45
 The title of this section is borrowed from a recent book by two well-known economists of innovation 
which exemplifies the kinds of criticisms of the patent system which have become prevalent in recent 
years.  JAFFE AND LERNER, supra note 8.
46 For a sample of the many discussions of these issues see, e.g., David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the 
Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005); Adelman and DeAngelis, supra 
note 17; John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 77 (2002); Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 101 (2003); Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Designing Optimal Software Patents, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, Robert 
Hahn, ed., (2005); Wesley M. Cohen and Stephen A. Merrill, Eds., PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY, National Research Council of the National Academies (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, The 
Suggestion Test as a Rule of Evidence in Patent Law, available at
http://www.chicagoip.com/CotropiaSuggestionTestDRAFT.pdf (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE WESTERN RES. L. 
REV. 769 (2004); Federal Trade Commission, supra note 8; Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent 
Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35-48 (2005); Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 8; JAFFE AND LERNER, 
supra note 8; Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
30
extent to which patents are needed to provide incentives for research and development,47
these trends have converged to raise growing concerns among academics and 
policymakers about whether patent law and policy are adequately designed to  “promote 
the Progress of  . . . useful Arts.”48  This discontent has gained the attention of members 
of Congress, who have proposed a major patent reform bill,49 of the Federal Trade 
Commission,50 of the National Academies of Sciences,51 and of the Supreme Court, which 
has granted review in five patent cases since 2005 and has solicited briefs from the Solicitor 
General in another four52 -- a level of Supreme Court interest unheard of in at least 25 years.  
It has also provoked responses from defenders of the present system, who argue that 
criticisms are overblown.53
763 (2002); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. 
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545 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 363 (2000 / 2001); 
Ronald J. Mann, The Myth of the Software Patent Thicket: An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship 
Between Intellectual Property and Innovation in Software Firms, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961 (2005); Gregory 
N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent 
Decisionmaking Irrational, available at:  www.ssrn.com/abstract=871684 (2005); Robert P. Merges, As 
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 577 (1999); Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUMBIA L. REV. 839 (1990); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred 
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); Merrill et al., 
supra note 8; Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
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Reform, 103 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1035 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
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Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds., MIT Press (2001); John R. Thomas, Formalism At The Federal 
Circuit,  52 AMER. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); John L. Turner, In Defense of the Patent Friendly Court 
Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence (2005), at http://www.terry.uga.edu/~jlturner/PatentFCH.pdf.
47 See, e.g., James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On 
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 1, 6-8 (2005) (reviewing empirical evidence for the 
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To accomplish its constitutionally mandated objective, patent protection must be 
carefully tailored to balance its benefits (which may include providing incentives to 
invent, functioning as a signal of technical competence, and facilitating a market for 
intangible knowledge) against its costs.  Because a patent provides exclusive rights to 
practice the patented technology, the costs that patents impose on society may include not 
only supra-competitive pricing of patented products but also increased barriers to 
building upon existing technology.  These costs arise because improving upon a patented 
technology may require either using the patented technology during development or 
incorporating it into the improved result.  In either case, United States law generally 
requires that the improver obtain a license from the holder of a patent on the foundational 
technology (or technologies, as is often the case).  Such licenses usually require the 
payment of royalties.  Negotiating authorization to build upon a patented technology can 
be expensive, especially when there is disagreement as to the relative value of various 
contributions to the improved technology.  In the extreme case, when the holders of the 
original patent and an improvement patent cannot agree on a licensing arrangement, this 
“blocking patent” situation can deprive the public of access to the improved technology 
altogether.
Part of the patent cost-benefit analysis is a requirement that patents be issued only 
for inventions that are “novel” and “nonobvious”54 -- sufficiently different from presently 
available technology to justify an award of legal exclusivity to the inventor.  The legal 
standard of nonobviousness sets the height of the bar for “sufficient” difference.  Along 
with other patentability requirements, it determines the tradeoff between social costs and 
benefits that results from the issuance of a patent.  Because patents can impose 
54 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
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substantial costs on consumers and subsequent innovators, one major objective of studies 
of the patent system is to determine whether the procedures and substantive standards 
that guide the issuance of patents are appropriately tuned. 
Recent developments in the law, along with the issuance of a burgeoning number 
of patents, have led to widespread perceptions among patent law scholars and 
policymakers that the system is off balance.55  It is argued, for example, that the legal 
standard of nonobviousness is insufficiently rigorous;56 that patent examiners have 
insufficient access to potentially relevant prior art in some fields such as software or 
business methods;57 and that patents issue on increasingly upstream technologies that 
form the basis for further advances.58  There are dire predictions of a patent “thicket,”59 in 
which technological progress is made increasingly difficult by the need to negotiate 
multiple levels of “blocking patent” rights on each of the many patented components that 
may be needed to produce a new commercial product.60  One way to avoid a potential 
thicket is for competing patent holders to negotiate cross-licenses or “patent pools.”  Such 
agreements between competitors raise concerns about collusion, however, and the 
societal ramifications depend upon the extent to which cross-licensing lowers barriers to 
55 See, e.g., references, supra note 8.
56 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, supra note 8; Merrill et al., supra note 8; Br. Of Twenty-Four 
Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2005) and references therein.  But see Cotropia, supra note 46 
(Federal Circuit “suggestion test” application is tailored to the complexity of the underlying technology) 
and Mandel, supra note 46, (empirical evidence that hindsight bias is likely to result in unwarranted 
findings of obviousness).
57 See, e.g. JAFFE AND LERNER, supra note 8 at 198-202.
58 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, supra note 8, and references therein. 
59 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 46; James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex 
Technologies, Working Paper, available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf; but see Mann, 
supra note 46; Adelman, supra note 46; Adelman and DeAngelis, supra note 17.
60
 See, e.g., Robert C. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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the use of complementary technologies (as opposed to allowing competitors to avoid 
competition from substitute technologies).61
Understanding the interaction between innovation and the patent system is a 
difficult job for many reasons.  Increased patenting, for example, can stem from various 
causes, including an increased pace of technological change, an increased range of 
patented technology due either to expansion of the scope of legally patentable subject 
matter or to the birth of new fields of technology, a growing perception of the usefulness 
of patents as business tools, or the issuance of lower quality patents.  Empirical 
investigation of the patent system can play an important role in understanding how to 
maintain the appropriate balance.  In what follows we report the results of a detailed 
study of the evolution of the patent citation network and argue that the evolution suggests 
that the patentability standard has been decreasing.  Before presenting our results, we 
detour to provide an overview of patent issuance and the meaning of patent citations and 
discuss how patent data has been used in previous studies.  With that context in place we 
then describe our study.
III.A.2 Patent Issuance and Prior Art Citations
United States patents are issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
after applications are examined to determine, among other things, whether the patent 
“claims” meet the legal requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.62  Patent claims 
are specific statements of the scope of the legal coverage of a patent.  As noted above, the 
legal effect of a patent is to provide the patentee a right to exclude others from using the 
61 See, e.g., Gilbert Goller, Competing, Complementary and Blocking Patents: Their Role in Determining 
Antitrust Violations in the Areas of Cross-Licensing, Patent Pooling and Package Licensing, 50 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 723 (1968); see also Federal Trade Commission, supra note 8.
62 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 for the main statutory requirements for patentability; see also MPEP.
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claimed technology without a license, as detailed in the infringement provisions of the 
patent statute.63
In the course of the examination of a patent application for novelty and 
nonobviousness, patent claims are compared against potential “prior art,” consisting in 
large part of prior patents and other publications in relevant technical fields.  Potential 
prior art is identified by applicants and their patent attorneys and by the official patent 
examiners.  To obtain a patent, the claimed invention must be “novel,” meaning there is 
no prior patent or other “prior art” that is identical to what is claimed.  More importantly, 
the claimed invention must be nonobvious, meaning that at the time it was invented, the 
invention would not have been obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art”  in 
the field of the invention.  When an invention is deemed obvious it is usually because it is 
an obvious combination of prior art technology.  Determining whether a combination of 
prior technology would have been obvious is a tricky matter, since it requires an exercise 
in hindsight and an exercise in putting oneself in the shoes of the skilled practitioner of 
the patented technology.64  The way in which obviousness is determined essentially sets 
the threshold of patentability.  
To guide this endeavor, and to try to avoid hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals employs a controversial test.  Under this “suggestion test,” a patent 
examiner may not reject a patent application as an obvious combination of prior art 
elements unless a “suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine” the prior art elements 
can be found “1) in the prior art references themselves; 2) in the knowledge of those of 
63 See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
64 See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 52; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?  Evaluating Inventions from 
the Perspective of the PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 885 (2004); Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd 
Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 438 (1966) (coining the name “Mr. PHOSITA”).
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ordinary skill in the art that certain references . . . are of special interest or importance in 
the field; or 3) from the nature of the problem to be solved, leading inventors to look to 
references relating to possible solutions to that problem.”65  The test has been widely, 
though certainly not universally, criticized as lowering the barrier to patenting of obvious 
combinations of or improvements on old technology66 and is the subject of a petition for 
certiorari for which the Supreme Court has requested briefing by the Solicitor General.67
Seeking out prior art patents (and other sources of prior art) is key to determining 
both novelty and nonobviousness.  The search for related prior patents is guided to a 
significant extent by an ad hoc classification scheme that has been developed by the 
USPTO over the years.68 References are cited in the issued patent document if their 
technical relationship to the claimed technology is close enough that they are relevant to 
determining whether the claimed technology is new and nonobvious.69  Recent studies 
show that patent examiners provide a large fraction of the cited references.  During the 
2001-2003 period, for example, examiners provided 67 per cent of all citations.  Indeed, 
40 per cent of the patents granted had all citations provided by examiners.70  Because 
65 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR International Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 176 at *7-*8 
(unpublished, Fed. Cir. January 6, 2005), citing Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 
2000).
66 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (1993); 
Lunney, supra note 46; John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003); Br. Of Twenty-Four 
Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2005).  But see, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 46, arguing that the 
Federal Circuit has not applied a “narrow” version of the suggestion test, but has tailored the test to the 
complexity of the technology.
67 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 327 (2005) (“The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in 
this case expressing the views of the United States.”)  See also Crouch, Dennis, Solicitor General to Opine 
on Landmark Obviousness Case, Patently-O Blog, available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com  (October 4, 
2005) and associated linked documents, including amicus briefs taking a variety of positions regarding the 
“suggestion test” issue.
68 See USPTO MANUAL OF PATENT CLASSIFICATION, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification.
69 See MPEP § 707.05.
70
 Juan Alcacer and Michelle Gittelman, How Do I Know What You Know? Patent Examiners and the 
Generation of Patent Citations, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=548003, (2004).
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such a large fraction of references are provided by patent examiners, and another large 
group by patent attorneys, citations do not necessarily indicate a direct flow of 
knowledge.
Patents and their citations form a directed network (meaning that citations go 
from later patents to earlier patents and not in the opposite direction) in which patents are 
the network “nodes” and citations are directed “links.”  Citations convey valuable 
information about the relationships between the technologies covered by the citing and 
cited patents.  The patent citation network thus can be viewed as a kind of map of the 
space of patented technology, indicating the relationships between various pieces of 
“property” in that space.  As discussed in Part III.B, the evolution of the network may 
help to illuminate whether patents are being awarded for more trivial technological steps.  
While the precise significance of a patent citation varies, a citation sometimes indicates 
that the claims of the cited patent encompass the claims of the citing patent and that a 
“blocking patent” situation exists so that permission from both patent owners is needed in 
order to use the invention claimed in the citing patent.  As will be discussed in Part IV, 
we believe it is likely that the structure of the patent citation “map” will reveal signatures 
of patent “thickets,” in which there is a high density of overlapping patent claims.
III.A.3 Relationship of this Study to Previous Uses of Patent Citation Data
The United States patent system provides a historical record that encompasses 
much of the history of innovation in this country and, increasingly, abroad.  Records of 
patent prosecution, patent citations, and patent litigation over many years are publicly 
available.  The history provided by patent records is incomplete, of course.  Many 
technical advances are either unpatented trade secrets or unpatentable technical know-
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how.  Historically, the record was limited to traditionally “industrial” innovations, though 
the scope of patentable subject matter has expanded to cover an increasingly broad range 
of innovations at an increasingly early stage of development.  Whatever its limitations, 
the patent record has long been recognized as a rich source of data about innovation and 
innovation policy.71  In the past, the form in which the data were available made 
quantitative analysis a difficult and painstaking process and limited the kinds of analyses 
that could be performed.  Recent advances in computer technology, however, along with 
the efforts of empirical economists have rendered a wealth of patent data suitable for 
large-scale quantitative analysis.72
A surge of attempts by economists, social scientists, and legal academics to 
capitalize on this new availability has resulted.73  This work has for the most part applied 
71 See, e.g., Griliches, Zvi, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE 1661-1707 (1990); Trajtenberg, Manuel, A Penny for your Quotes: Patent Citations and the 
Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172 (1990).
72 See especially Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation 
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, in Adam B. Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg, eds., 
PATENTS, CITATIONS, & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, MIT Press (2003).
73 See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 17; Adelman and DeAngelis, supra note 17; Bessen and Meurer,  
supra note 47; Emmanuel Duguet and Megan MacGarvie, How Well Do Patent Citations Measure Flows 
of Technology? Evidence from French Innovation Surveys, 14 ECON. OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECH. 374 
(2005); Lee Fleming, Adam Juda, and Charles King III, Small Worlds and Regional Innovative Advantage, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper Series, No. 04-008 (2003); Lee Fleming, Recombinant 
Uncertainty in Technological Search, 47 MGM’T SCIENCE 117 (2001); Lee Fleming and Olav Sorenson, 
Technology as a Complex Adaptive System: Evidence from Patent Data, 30 RESEARCH POL’Y 1019 (2001); 
John Hagedoorn and Myriam Cloodt, Measuring Innovative Performance: Is There an Advantage in Using 
Multiple Indicators?, 32 RESEARCH POL’Y 1365 (2003); Hall and Ziedonis, supra note 47; Hall, supra note 
46, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005); D. Harhoff, F. Narin, F.M. Scherer, and K. Vopel, Citation 
Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. AND STATISTICS 511 (1998); Dietmar 
Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer, and Katrin Vopel, Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent 
Rights, 32 RESEARCH POL’Y 1343 (2003); Zan Huang, Hsinchun Chen, Alan Yip, Gavin Ng, Fei Guo, Zhi-
Kai Chen, and Mihail C. Roco, Longitudinal Patent Analysis for Nanoscale Science and Engineering: 
Country, Institution and Technology Field, 5 J. NANOPARTICLE RES. 333 (2003); Adam B. Jaffe and 
Manuel Trajtenberg, eds., PATENTS, CITATIONS, & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY (2003); Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality And Research Productivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 Econ. J. 441 (Royal Economic Society 2004); Alan C. 
Marco, The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence, 14 REV. FINANCIAL ECON. 323 
(2005); Alan C. Marco, Strategic Patent Extension in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Patent and Pricing 
Data, American Law and Economics Association Conference, New York (May 2005), available at
http://irving.vassar.edu/faculty/am/Papers/drugs05.pdf; Alan C. Marco, Dynamics of Patent Citations, 
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statistical regression techniques to connect patent characteristics -- such as the number of 
citations made and received, the number of patent claims and whether the patent was 
renewed; inventor characteristics -- such as geographical location and employment 
context; and, most recently, patent examiner characteristics -- such as length of 
experience -- to financial, economic and technological indicators.  In this way, patent data 
has been used to investigate knowledge flows and spillovers;74 to attempt to determine 
the characteristics of valuable patents;75 and to try to understand the role innovation plays 
in the behavior of various types of institutions, from universities to small and large 
firms.76
Because of its heterogeneity and local structure, the network of patents and 
citations is a much richer source of information about the patent system and the 
associated technological development than is generally captured by these techniques.  
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Network science analysis of the patent citation network has great potential both to 
complement existing econometric studies of patent citations and to advance the 
understanding of networks in general because of the fact that the patent citation network 
is one of the largest and most completely characterized networks available for study.  
Though legal scholars and economists have generally not employed a network 
approach,77 a few studies of innovation by social scientists have applied social network 
analysis techniques to patent data.  These studies, some of which are described in a bit 
more detail in Part IV, view patents as “footprints” of innovation but do not focus on 
their legal significance as conveyors of exclusive rights.  They interpret the pattern of 
patent citations to indicate the combination of past technologies into new innovations and 
use the patent citation network to investigate theories of innovation as recombinant 
search.78  These theories of innovation should be of interest to legal scholars since they 
move beyond a linear model of sequential or cumulative innovation and attempt to use 
network concepts and measures to incorporate some of the complexities of the innovative 
process.  Dealing with inventive combinations is a critical and ill-understood aspect of 
patent law, as demonstrated by the difficulty in finding an effective approach to 
nonobviousness.
Our treatment of patent citations also differs from that of a number of previous 
studies because we attempt to make minimal assumptions about the significance of 
individual citations.  Many previous studies have assumed that when a patent cites 
another patent it is an indication of knowledge flow from the cited patent to the inventors 
77
 A notable exception is the work of Prof. Gavin Clarkson, who is employing a network density metric to 
investigate patent pools.  See supra note 6.
78
 Fleming, supra note 73; Fleming and Sorenson, supra note 73.
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of the citing patent.79  This assumption is questionable in light of data, only recently 
available in electronic form, showing the extent to which citations are inserted, not by the 
patent applicant (or even by the applicant’s attorneys), but by patent examiners long after 
the time of invention.80  Our approach to patent citations is parsimonious and limited to 
an assumption that citations generally indicate significant technological relationships
between patented technologies.  We do not attempt to probe knowledge flows.  
Finally, this study differs from many econometric studies because we make no 
assumptions about the distribution or functional form that describes the citation data.  
Econometric studies using patent data have been criticized due to their reliance on 
implicit assumptions about the distribution of citation data that may affect the analysis.81
As already mentioned, citation data is highly skewed and far from the “normal 
distributions” which typically are used in statistical analysis.  Thus, particular care must
be taken in interpreting those analyses.82  Network science approaches avoid making such 
assumptions and are tailored to highly heterogeneous systems, in which broad, skewed 
distributions are typical.
III.B The Evolving Patent Citation Network:  Is Patenting Getting Out of Hand?
It is widely remarked that patenting has burgeoned since the 1980s and almost 
equally widely alleged that patenting is getting out of hand -- that patents are increasingly 
of low quality, providing the transaction costs of a divided and proprietary knowledge 
base without the benefit of spurred innovative progress.  In fact, the number of patents 
79 See, e.g., many of the studies collected in Jaffe and Trajtenberg, supra  note 73.
80 See, e.g., Alcacer and Gittelman, supra note 70; Sampat, supra note 73; Paola Criscuolo and Bart 
Verspagen, Does It Matter Where Patent Citations Come From?  Inventor versus Examiner Citations in 
European Patents, Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht: MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology (2005).
81 See, e.g., Adelman and DeAngelis, supra note 17, for a critique of various statistical studies of patent 
citations.
82 Id.  
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issued by the USPTO has increased more or less exponentially since the patent system 
was inaugurated in 1790, and it is true that the rate of increase, which had been more or 
less constant since 1870, sharpened noticeably in the early 1980s.  (See Figure 6.)  In and 
of itself an increase in patenting is an ambiguous signal, however.  The early 1980s was a 
time of both technological ferment and changes in patent law.  Both the computer 
revolution and the biotechnology industry got their starts at around this time.  Moreover 
(and not coincidentally), the Supreme Court in 1980 and 1981 issued its opinions in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty83 and Diamond v. Diehr,84 putting its stamp of approval on the 
patentability of biological materials and computer software, respectively.  In 1983, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals published its first patent opinion,85 inaugurating what 
many have argued has been an era of patent-friendly legal review after a period of 
purported judicial hostility to patentees.86
Any evaluation of the significance of the patenting boom must thus attempt to 
distinguish among potential causes which encompass at least three possibilities. 
Increased patenting might stem from a faster pace of technological change; from a 
broader range of patented technology (which may have resulted both from the extension 
of the scope of legally patentable subject matter and from technological advances that 
have broken new ground); or from a weakened patentability standard.  In this section we 
use a network approach to separate these effects.  Our results indicate that not only the 
pace of innovation and breadth of patented technology, but also the pattern of patent 
citations has changed in recent years.  The change in citation patterns indicates an 
83
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84
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85 In re Hick, 699 F.2d 1331 (1983).
86 See, e.g., Merges (2000), supra note 46.
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increasingly skewed distribution of “citability” for patents issued beginning in the early 
1990s.  If “citability” reflects technical value, then the increasing gap between the most 
and least citable patents reflects an increasing gap between most and least valuable 
patents during the 1990s.  
While a definitive interpretation of this change is not possible without further 
investigation, we argue that this change is not likely to be due entirely to an increased 
pace and scope of patentable innovations and that it suggests that patentability standards 
have been weakening.  The timing of the increase in citability stratification is suggestive 
of an association with the Federal Circuit’s increasing reliance on the “motivation or 
suggestion to combine” test for nonobviousness, though other changes occurring around 
that time -- most noticeably the rise in importance of the Internet -- might also have 
changed the distribution of patent value.
In this Section we describe the results of our study of the evolution of the pattern 
of citations in the patent citation network.  In analyzing the patent citation network, we 
have used the Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg dataset87 which includes the approximately 16 
million citations made by the more than two million patents issued by the USPTO 
between 1975 and 1999.88  We begin by discussing the effects of innovative pace and 
breadth on the network’s evolution and explain why these effects are not sufficient to 
explain what is happening in the network.  We then turn to the heart of our analysis, in 
which we demonstrate that since the early 1990s patents have become increasingly 
stratified in their citability.  We interpret this stratification as evidence of an increasing 
technical value gap between the most and least valuable patents.  We then argue that this 
87
 Hall et al, supra note 72.
88
 Our analysis includes all of the patents and citations in the database.  We do not randomly sample the 
data.
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increasing value gap is likely to be due to a lowering patentability threshold and that 
changes in the nonobviousness standard may have been responsible.  
III.B.1 Concerning the Pace and Breadth of Innovative Progress
Before describing our analysis of the changing pattern of citations, which we 
argue suggests that the standard of patentability has been lowered, we consider how to 
separate out the effects of either a faster pace of technological advance or a broader 
landscape of patented technologies.  We certainly do not deny that the pace of 
technological progress may be increasing and that the breadth of patented technology has 
expanded.  However, we do not aim to investigate those effects here.  Rather, we want to 
find out whether additional important changes in patenting may be occurring.  
For this reason, in our analysis we measure time and patent age in units of patent 
numbers, rather than in units of months and years.  We do this to mask out any effects of 
a mere “speed-up” of technological progress.  If innovation is simply occurring at a faster 
pace without any change in the innovative “step” between patents or the character of the 
relationships between patents, then measuring “age” and “time” in terms of patent 
numbers should cancel out the effects of the increasing pace.  After canceling out this 
source of time-dependence, remaining changes that we observe must be due to some
more fundamental change in the way in which the citation network is evolving. 
Accounting for the effects of a possible broadening of the subject matter of 
patented technology is a bit more difficult.  To understand this issue, imagine a 
“landscape” of patented technology.  As more patents are issued, they might overlap the 
existing “landscape” by, for example, claiming a somewhat improved or different version 
of a well-established technology -- such as coffee filters or disposable diapers, for 
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example.  Alternatively, they might strike out into new territory by, for example, being 
the first patent to claim a practical application of a scientific advance, such as stem cell 
research.  While this is surely an over-simplified view of the complexities of 
technological advancement, it is perhaps sufficient to illustrate that there is a distinction 
between the size of the innovative step represented by a new patent (how much better is 
the claimed disposable diaper, for example) and the extent to which it represents a 
broadening of the technological landscape.  This distinction should be reflected in the 
patent citation network, though how to decipher the relevant patterns in detail is a subject 
for future research.  For present purposes, a few simple observations are sufficient.  
We have measured two quantities that are relevant to the question of to what 
degree the “space” of patented technologies is “spreading out” as opposed to “filling in.”  
The first is the average number of citations made per patent.  As shown in the top graph 
in Figure 7, the average number of citations made per patent has been steadily growing 
(in fact, nearly proportional to the number of patents, which is our measure of time) 
throughout the period of our data.  This increase in citations made is consistent with an 
increasingly dense space of narrow patents, with new patents having an increasing 
number of patents to cite because more and more patents are material.  It is similarly 
consistent with patenting of smaller and smaller incremental advances, such that 
inventors need to cite more patents to reach back to all those which encompass the claims 
of the new patent.  It would also be consistent with an increased issuance of patents that 
are based on combinations of older technology.  But the increasing number of citations 
made per patent seems unlikely to have been caused by expansion of the technological 
frontier.  Patents that are breaking new ground by heading off in uncharted technological 
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directions would, if anything, seem likely to encounter fewer material prior art patents to 
cite.  
Some criticisms of the recent evolution of the patent system, particularly those in 
the popular press, have highlighted another way in which the breadth of patented 
technologies might be expanding by providing examples of “outlier” patents (often of a 
somewhat humorous character) such as the much-discussed peanut-butter-and-jelly 
sandwich patents.89  If the landscape of patented technology were being expanded 
significantly by the addition of such “outlier” patents, one would expect that the average 
citability of brand new patents would decline since such patents would be less likely to 
spawn improvements and follow-on innovation than patents on more mainstream 
technology.  In fact, our analysis of the citation network’s evolution finds that the average 
likelihood that a new patent will be cited by the next patent that issues has increased
somewhat in recent years due to the increasing number of citations made by each patent 
(see the bottom graph in Figure 7), suggesting that true technological “outlier” patents, 
while making for entertaining rhetoric, are not a major part of the patenting explosion.
On the whole then, as the number of patents has increased, patent examiners and 
applicants have deemed it necessary to cite more patents, suggesting that the density of 
“mainstream” patents is increasing despite the undeniable increase in the breadth of 
patented technology.
Having accounted for a possible speed-up in innovative progress through our 
choice to measure time and age in units of patent numbers and having concluded that 
recent citation patterns are not likely to be explained solely in terms of an expansion of 
89 See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd: Too Many Patents are Just as Bad for Society as Too Few, 
FORBES, (Jun. 24, 2002); Varian, Hal R., Patent Protection Gone Awry, NEW YORK TIMES, ECONOMIC 
SCENE (October 21, 2004); see also http://www. patentlysilly.com.
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the breadth of patented technology, we now turn to the question of whether something 
else is going on in the patent system beyond an overall “speeding up” or “spreading out.”
III.B.2 The Evolving Citability Distribution  
Our approach is motivated by statistical physics studies of a diverse range of other 
growing networks.  We describe the evolution of the patent citation network in terms of 
the probability that a patent with given characteristics will be cited, which we call 
“citability.”  To get a result that will provide insight into the general features of the 
network evolution, we attempt to describe the probability of citation using only those 
characteristics that strongly affect the likelihood that a given patent will be cited.  
Because a case-by- case evaluation of the underlying reasons that one patent might cite 
another is impossible for a large network of citations, we look for objective 
characteristics that we expect, on average, to be good proxies for the underlying citation 
process.  In our study, we hypothesize that we will be able to describe the evolution of 
the patent network to a very good approximation by assuming that the probability that a 
particular patent will be cited at a given time depends primarily on its age, which we will 
call l, and on the number of times it has already been cited, which we will call k.90  Our 
results bear out the hypothesis that, on average, these two characteristics are highly 
determinative of the likelihood that a patent will be cited.
Our assumption that the probability that a patent will be cited depends on its age 
requires little explanation -- technology tends to become obsolete.  Our expectation that 
the probability that a patent will be cited depends on how many citations it has already 
received derives both from our intuitions about patents and from experience with other 
90
 A more complete description of our data analysis procedure is available in our technical publication, 
which is available at http://www.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0508132.
47
evolving networks.  As we discussed in Part II, one of the most interesting discoveries of 
network science has been that it is very common for nodes that already have many links 
to acquire additional links more quickly than nodes with fewer links.  This preferential 
attachment or, colloquially, “rich get richer” phenomenon might also be reasonably 
expected to occur in the patent citation network.  
There is considerable statistical evidence that highly cited patents are more 
valuable and may be of greater technological merit.  Moreover, technology has its own 
“popular crowd,” depending on what field is “hot” at a particular time.  In our analysis, 
we make no assumptions about exactly how and for what reason a patent’s chances of 
being cited might depend on how many citations it has already received.  We simply 
“guess” that the number of previous citations to a patent, which we call k, will be relevant 
to its likelihood of being cited again.  Our computations confirm that guess, as we will 
explain below.
Of course, the fact that we extract a citation “probability” is not meant to suggest 
that the particular citation choices made by patent examiners or applicants are actually 
random.  Our results mean only that, cumulatively, those individual citation decisions 
result in a likelihood of citation which depends in interesting ways on k and l.91  Patents 
presumably have inherent “quality” that affects whether they are cited, just as individuals 
have personalities that make them more popular and websites have content that make 
them more useful.  Our present analysis says nothing directly about the inherent patent 
91
 There is also an overall time-dependent scale factor, S(t) (where t is measured by patent numbers).  More 
specifically, we find that the probability function P(l,k,t) can be written to a good first approximation as the 
ratio of a time-independent function, A(k,l), and a time-dependent scale factor, S(t).  The scale factor S(t) is 
just the sum of A(k,l) over all existing patents at time t.  Thus S(t) changes over time only because the 
number of patents of age l and connectedness k changes.  See our technical paper, available at
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0508132, for a detailed explanation of this factor.
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quality of any particular patent, but does allow us to make reasonable inferences about 
the patent system as a whole based on the observed citation distribution and the way in 
which it has changed in recent years.
To find the likelihood of citation for given k and l we developed a novel iterative 
technique which we used to extract from the patent citation data the average likelihood 
that a patent with k previous citations of age l will be cited again.  We do not assume a 
particular functional form for this probability -- the functional dependence on citations 
previously received and patent age is derived directly from the data.  For present 
purposes, let us focus on the way in which the probability of being cited depends on k --
the number of citations already received.  We will return to the dependence on age in Part 
IV.  
As it turns out, the way in which the probability of being cited depends on k is 
more or less the same for patents of any age.  (See Figure 8.)  The likelihood that a patent 
will be cited does depend on its age -- very young patents are not cited much, then the 
likelihood of being cited grows rapidly in the first couple of years after a patent issues, 
and then it falls slowly thereafter.  (See Figure 9.)  But no matter the age of the patent, the 
ratio of the likelihood that a patent with ten previous citations will be cited to the 
likelihood that one with three previous citations will be cited is nearly the same.  So if, 
for example, patents that are 10,000 patent numbers “old” are five times more likely to be 
cited if they have ten previous citations than if they have three, the same will be true for 
patents that are 100,000 patent numbers “old.”92
92
 Mathematically, this means that the likelihood of being cited can be written approximately as a product 
of two functions, i.e., A(k,l) = Al(l)Ak(k).  Al(l) depends only on age while Ak(k) depends only on the 
number of citations previously received.
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The way in which the likelihood of being cited depends on the number of citations 
already received, which we call Ak(k), is shown in Figure 8, which displays the results 
extracted from the data for patents of several different ages.  The more often a patent has 
already been cited (the higher its value of k) the more likely it is to be cited again (the 
higher its value of Ak(k)) -- the signature of preferential attachment.
This demonstration of “preferential attachment” in the patent citation network is 
not especially surprising -- preferential attachment is a common property of growing 
networks and is intuitively sensible in the patent system.  Preferential attachment is 
cumulative -- highly cited patents are more likely to be cited, hence becoming even more 
highly cited and even more likely to be cited, and so forth.  The pattern of “citability” 
shown in Figure 8 thus eventually leads to an extremely skewed distribution of citations 
eventually received by patents.  (See Figure 1, which shows the proportion of patents that
had received 0, 1, 2, . . . .  citations by 1999.)  Most patents are hardly cited at all, while a 
few patents become citation “billionaires” (well, “hundredaires,” really).  If we make the 
reasonable (and empirically supported) assumption that the number of times a patent is 
cited signals its technological value, we can infer that the very skewed and broad citation 
distribution in Figure 1 reflects a very stratified distribution of patent values, with a few 
superstars and a vastly larger number of patents that go nowhere.  
This general picture of a highly skewed patent value is well known by now.93  Our 
network analysis allows us to get behind this general observation, however, to ask just 
how stratified patent value is and how the extent of stratification has evolved over time.  
If more patents are being issued simply as a result of faster or broader technological 
93 See, e.g. Bessen and Meurer, supra note 47 at 8; F.M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy
for a World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL’Y 559 (2000).
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progress, we would expect the degree of stratification to remain about the same over 
time.  There would be proportionally more superstars as well as proportionally more 
“duds,” but the extent to which the superstars predominated over the duds would be more 
or less unchanged.  On the other hand, if the patentability standard is lowered, there 
would be not only more patents issued, but a higher proportion of them would be less 
important -- the degree to which highly citable patents dominate trivial patents should 
increase.
The citability function, Ak(k), gives us a quantitative handle on the degree of 
stratification among issued patents.  We arrive at this function after factoring out the 
effects of patent aging due to obsolescence (which, as noted, turn out to be roughly the 
same no matter how may citations a patent has previously received) and it thus gives a 
relatively simple and unobscured view of the underlying “citability” of patents.  Looking 
at Figure 8 we see that the citability of a patent on average increases somewhat more than 
proportionally to the number of citations already received.  We can quantify this 
“somewhat more” by noting that Ak(k) is closely fit by the form Ak(k) ~ k.  The 
parameter  is a measure of the extent to which highly cited patents are preferred.  When 
averaged over all of the data from 1975 through 1999,   1.20 (with an estimated error 
of less than .01).
To give us a feel for the interpretation of the values of , we can compare this 
value for the patent system to known results from other network studies.  If there were no 
aging or obsolescence, nothing would inhibit old patents from acquiring extremely large 
numbers of citations.  In that situation, theoretical network models have shown that when 
  is larger than 1 the network “condenses” to a highly unequal situation in which nearly 
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all nodes in the system have very low connectivity.  These “unimportant” nodes are all 
connected to a very small (finite even in an infinite network) number of very highly 
connected nodes94 -- almost all nodes are “peons” connected to a very few “royal” nodes 
and there is no “middle class” of moderately connected nodes.  In the patent system, such 
an extreme stratification does not occur because highly cited patents eventually become 
obsolete and generally cease to be cited.  However, the fact that  > 1 in the patent 
network still suggests that citations are highly concentrated -- there is a highly unequal 
distribution of patent “citability.”
 What is most interesting for present purposes is that the network analysis gives a 
means to investigate the way in which the degree of stratification in patent citability has 
varied over time.  We do this by calculating  using only the patents within a 500,000-
patent sliding time window and calculating a value for  after every 100,000 patents.  
The value of  -- and hence the degree of stratification of patent citability -- has varied in 
an interesting way since 1982 (the earliest date for which we can make the calculation) as 
can be seen in Figure 10.  While Figure 6 shows that the number of patents issued 
annually has been rising essentially since the inauguration of the patent system and rising 
very rapidly since the early 1980s, the stratification of citability, as reflected in the value 
of , decreased slightly from 1982 until about 1993.  (We do not know what was 
happening to it earlier because we do not have sufficient earlier data).  Beginning in 
around 1993, however, it began to rise and continued to rise throughout the period of our 
analysis (through 1999).  Thus, during a period throughout which the absolute number of 
94
 P.L. Krapivsky., S. Redner, and F. Leyvraz, Connectivity of Growing Random Networks, 85 PHYS. REV. 
LETT. 4629-32 (2000).
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patents issued was rapidly rising, the relationships between those patents were also 
changing -- but not in a way that simply reflects increasing numbers.  Patent citability 
became increasingly stratified.  The increase in  -- corresponding to increasingly 
stratified citation patterns -- began nearly 10 years later than the beginning of the recent 
rise in patent issuance and 10 years after the major change in the patent system 
represented by the inauguration of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
III.B.3 Interpreting the Increasing Stratification of Patent Citation Patterns
How should we interpret the increasing stratification of patent “citability” since 
the early 1990’s?  One plausible interpretation, and the one that we find most convincing 
in light of our investigation of the patent citation network thus far, is that the patentability 
standard has decreased, resulting in the issuance of a larger fraction of more trivial -- and 
hence less citable -- patents.  Since the increasing stratification did not begin until about 
ten years after the establishment of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, it seems 
unlikely to have been the result of the mere establishment of a “patent-friendly” court.  
Nor does the timing suggest that the increasing stratification resulted from the opening up 
of the patent system to patents on biotechnology (which happened around 1980), 
software (again around 1980), or business methods (the State Street Bank opinion issued 
in 1998).95  We suggest that the legal change most likely to have resulted in the observed 
increasing stratification of patent citability (and, by inference, technical value) was a 
decreasing standard of non-obviousness adopted by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
(followed of course by the USPTO and, presumably, by patent applicants themselves in 
making their filing decisions), reflected in the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
95 State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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combine” test for nonobviousness, which took hold at the Federal Circuit in the early 
1990s.96  (Figure 11 shows the increasing use of the “suggestion test” by the Federal 
Circuit.)
While we argue that the decreasing standard of non-obviousness is the most likely 
explanation for the increasing stratification of patent citability -- and, inferentially, the 
increased disparity in patents’ technical worth -- there are other possible explanations.  It 
is possible, for example, that the change in citability over the years reflects a change in 
citation practice, rather than a change in inherent patent characteristics.  We are inclined 
to reject this possibility at present because most of the trends in patent citation practice 
that we can think of -- most notably the increased ease of computerized searching for 
prior art -- seem unlikely to have changed direction from decreasing  to increasing  in 
the 1990s.  Computerized searching seems likely to have had a “one-way” influence.  
One way to check for the influence of search technology would be to compare the 
behavior of the United States patent citation network with other citation networks, such 
as the European patent citation network or the network of citations in scientific journals.  
Another possibility, which we plan to explore in future studies, is that the average 
stratification parameter  is changing because of changes in the subject matter “mix” of 
patented technologies.  If patent “importance” is inherently more stratified in one field of 
technology than in another (because of a difference in the importance of “pioneer” 
patents, for example), then an increasing prevalence of patents in that field could change 
the average degree of stratification that we observe.  Preliminary studies of a rough 
96
 It has also been argued that the Federal Circuit has applied the suggestion test in an increasingly narrow 
fashion making it more difficult to demonstrate obviousness.  See, e.g., Br. Of Twenty-Four Intellectual 
Property Law Professors, supra note 56, and references therein. But see Cotropia, supra note 46 (arguing 
that the Federal Circuit has tailored the stringency of its test to the complexity of the technology).
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division of patents into six technological categories did not turn up any significant 
variations in , but a more in-depth study of differences between technological fields is 
under way.  This possibility is especially interesting because the timing of the increased 
stratification  in the early 1990s corresponds to the time at which the Internet began to 
take on central social significance.
To summarize, in this Part we have shown empirically that the distribution of 
patent “citability” has been changing in recent years.  Prior to about 1993, “citability” 
was becoming slightly more “egalitarian” -- the difference between the citability of the 
most highly cited patents and that of less cited patents was decreasing.  From 1993 
through 1999, the trend was reversed.  “Citability’ became more stratified, with highly 
cited patents becoming more and more citable compared to less cited patents.  In line 
with our intuition and with earlier studies of patent value, we interpret citability as a 
reflection (on average) of technological importance.  We thus conclude that the 
distribution of patent importance also became more stratified during that period.  Though 
there are other possible explanations of this trend, we hypothesize that it may reflect a 
lowered patentability threshold reflected in the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine” test of non-obviousness, and resulting in the issuance of more trivial patents.   
IV. Future Directions and Some Preliminary Results
Part III demonstrated how a network approach to the evolution of the patent 
citation network illuminates the debate over whether patentability standards have fallen 
in recent years.  The network approach has the potential to elucidate other questions of
patent and innovation policy, some of which we discuss briefly here.
IV.A. Patent Classification and the Meaning of Analogous Arts
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The categorization of patents by technological field of endeavor is of both 
practical and analytical significance.  Patent classification plays an important role in prior 
art searching.  Moreover, under the patent doctrine of “analogous arts,” the technological 
field of endeavor determines which prior art patents must be considered in determining 
whether a claimed invention is nonobvious.97  Though the law requires that novelty be 
absolute, nonobviousness is judged only with respect to prior technology in “analogous 
arts” of which a “person having ordinary skill in the art” would reasonably be apprised.  
To apply this standard, it is necessary, of course to determine which fields of technology 
are “analogous” to the field of the patented invention.  Moreover, any study of 
technological innovation or of the functioning of the patent system which relies on patent 
data and seeks to inquire into potential differences between fields of technology must 
find some means of categorizing patents. 
At present, each patent application is categorized by a USPTO examiner 
according to a scheme of classes and subclasses that has been developed in an ad hoc
manner over the years.  The classification is used to assist examiners and patent 
applicants in searching for relevant prior art.  The USPTO patent classifications have also 
been used by researchers to assess such things as the “generality” of a patent (evaluated 
by the extent to which it is cited by patents from different classes), the “originality” of a 
patent (evaluated by the extent to which it cites patents from different classes), the 
“technological closeness” of firms involved in patent litigation (evaluated by the extent to 
which the patents assigned to those firms are in the same classes), and the way in which 
97 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1504.03; MPEP § 904.01(c).
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innovations recombine components from the prior art.98  The usefulness of these 
measures is limited, however, by the fact that the classification scheme is ad hoc and 
does not provide a well-defined way to measure the degree of distinctiveness between 
inventions in different subclasses or classes. 
Network analysis provides an alternative way to measure technological distance 
that is more fine-grained and quantitative than comparing USPTO classifications.  The 
number of citation “hops” that it takes to get from one patent to another is one way of 
measuring how “far apart” two patented technologies are.  Essentially, patented 
technology is likely to be related most closely to the technology of the patents it cites or 
is cited by directly, less closely to the technology of the patent that is two steps away, and 
so on.  The citation path length measure may be used both to evaluate the existing 
classification scheme and as an alternative to measures based on it.
In a preliminary study, we have measured the overall “size” of the patent citation 
network by looking at the shortest directed path lengths between patent nodes.  As 
discussed in Part II, one of the most interesting results of network science studies is that 
many networks have what has come to be called the “small world” property.99  This 
property, made famous by the phrase “six degrees of separation”100 and by the “Kevin 
98 James E. Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, Boston Univ. School of Law 
Working Paper No. 05-18, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685 (2005); Fleming, supra note 73; 
Fleming and Sorenson, supra note 73; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, supra note 73.
99 See WATTS, supra note 2; Newman supra note 2; Albert and Barabasi, supra note 2; Watts and Strogatz, 
supra note 25 for discussions of the basic properties of small world networks.
100 See WATTS, supra note 2; S. Milgram, The Small World Problem, 2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 60-67 (1967) 
(reporting Milgram’s famous experiment which involved counting the number of transfers necessary to get 
a letter delivered from an arbitrary individual in Omaha, Nebraska to a specified individual in Sharon, 
Massachusetts).
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Bacon game,”101 measures how closely knit a network is.  To determine whether a 
network has the small world property, one counts how many “hops” from node to node 
along the network must be made to travel between any two nodes.  The number of hops 
along the shortest path between two nodes is sometimes called the “geodesic distance.”  
The maximum geodesic distance between any two nodes in the network is the “diameter” 
of the network.  If the maximum geodesic distance between any two nodes in a network 
remains relatively small,102 the network has the “small world property.”  The diameter of 
many real world networks is surprisingly small.103
We have determined so far that the patent citation network contains one “giant” 
connected component, and some very small components.  The longest directed path 
length (where we only allow “hops” from citing to cited patents) between nodes in the 
“giant” component (of nearly 4 million patents) is only 24 steps.104 In fact, the patent 
citation network displays the small world property discussed in Part II.A.1.b.  In the 
future, we will expand this calculation to study the distribution of path lengths in more 
detail and to consider undirected path lengths (allowing hops from citing to cited or from 
cited to citing patents), which may provide a more intuitively reasonable measure of how 
close the technological relationship between two patents is.
Besides giving us an overall view of how closely connected the patent space is, 
the network path length may also be used to evaluate and explore existing patent 
classification schemes.  Distances between patents in the same USPTO category may be 
101
 The Kevin Bacon Game, which may be played at http://www.cs.virginia.edu/oracle/, counts any two 
actors as linked if they have had roles in the same movie.  The “Oracle of Kevin Bacon” shows that any 
two of the 800,000 or so actors in the Internet Movie Database are linked to Kevin Bacon in an average of 
fewer than 3 steps.
102
 Technically, if it increases no more rapidly than the logarithm of the number of nodes.
103 See, e.g., WATTS, supra note 2, Newman, supra note 2, BARABASI, supra note 2.
104
 The giant component contains more than two million patents because it includes cited patents from 
before 1975.
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compared with distances between patents in different categories to evaluate the accuracy 
of the classification system.  Moreover, average distances between different categories 
can be computed.  Path length measures may provide a more fine-grained (and 
complementary) measure of technological closeness than metrics that use the number of 
overlapping subclasses in the USPTO classification system.
An understanding of how closely connected the patent space is could eventually 
have significant implications for the interpretation of important concepts in patent law.  
Many legal questions depend on the concept of the “person having ordinary skill in the 
art,” where the “art” is the technical field of the invention.  These legal inquiries assume 
that the “art” to which a patent pertains may be sensibly defined.  Studies of the 
connectedness of the patent network may provide insight into the extent to which this 
assumption is meaningful.  A path length measure may even be of practical use to 
determine whether two patents are in analogous “arts.”
The small world property of the network also suggests the intriguing possibility 
that a relatively small number of “hub” patents are integral to many apparently separate 
fields (and thus provide “shortcuts” between patents in disparate fields).  In future work, 
we hope to test the “hub” hypothesis and to study qualitatively any “hub” patents that we 
can identify. 
IV.B. How Innovation Builds on Prior Technology
While lawyers focus on patents as tokens of legal exclusivity, economists and 
social scientists have studied the process of innovation by viewing patents as “footprints” 
of technological change.105 From this perspective, citations may be viewed as indicators 
105 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 73; Fleming and Sorenson, supra note 73; Joel M. Podolny, Toby E. 
Stuart, and Michael T. Hannan, Networks, Knowledge, and Niches: Competition in the Worldwide 
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of the ways in which prior technologies have been combined to produce a new invention.  
These studies have implications for patent law and policy because a well-designed patent 
system should reflect the way in which technological progress actually occurs.106
Our study of the evolution of the patent citation network has already produced 
intriguing information about the way in which new inventions depend on prior 
technology.  In Part III, we focused on the way in which patent citability depends on the 
number of times a patent has been previously cited.  In the course of that analysis, we 
also determined how patent citability depends on a patent’s age (in patent numbers).  Just 
as we learned that the way in which a patent’s citability varies with the number of 
citations it has already received is roughly the same for patents of all ages, we also found 
that the way in which patent age affects the likelihood of being cited is nearly the same 
no matter how many times a patent has been cited before.  Thus, the dependence of 
citability on age, which we call Al(l), is relatively independent of k, especially at large l 
and k, as shown in Figure 9 for several values of k.  
Citability peaks at a relatively young age (small l) and then decays slowly for 
older patents.107  For large l, Al(l) ~ l-, where   1.6.  This power law form signifies a 
long, slow decay -- very old patents are still being cited.  This observed dependence of 
citation probability on patent age provides insight into the complicated dynamics of 
technical innovation.  The peak in citations relatively soon after issuance may correspond 
to “typical,” incremental improvements, which are likely to occur relatively soon after a 
Semiconductor Industry, 1984-1991, 102 AMER. J. SOCIOLOGY 659 (1996); Joel M. Podolny and Toby E. 
Stuart, A Role-Based Ecology of Technological Change, 100 AMER. J. SOCIOLOGY 1224 (1995).
106
 Though those studies are subject to the caveat that they have thus far not taken into account the 
possibility that the quantum of innovation signified by a patent can change as a result of legal doctrine.  
107
 Previous studies of citation lags have also noted that old patents continue to be cited.  See, e.g., Hall et 
al., supra note 72 at 421-24, 448-41.
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patent issues.  The tail of citations that occur long after issuance includes “pioneer”-type 
patents that continue to influence innovation over long periods of time.  However, while 
highly cited patents are more likely to be cited at any age, the form of Al(l) is the same 
even for patents that have rarely been cited in the past.  This means that even patents that 
have been cited very rarely or never in the past are sometimes cited long after issuance.  
Thus there is no age at which patents can be pronounced “dead.”  While most 
patents that have not been cited shortly after they are issued will never be cited, there are 
“sleeper” patents that go without citation for long periods of time, only to reawaken at a 
later time.  If one makes the reasonable assumption that receiving a citation is some 
indication of social value, this observation suggests that inventive progress is not simply 
a matter of steady accumulation of incremental progress, but a complicated process in 
which old patents may gain new significance in light of later advances.  The long tail of 
inventive relevance also underscores the difficulty of predicting the social value of 
innovations in advance.  In future work, we hope to obtain a qualitative portrait of the 
types of patents that are cited after long periods of dormancy. 
Most of the analysis of the process of innovation reflected in the legal and 
economic literature has of necessity taken a simplified, linear view in which innovation is 
pictured as “sequential” or “cumulative.”  In fact, of course, innovation is a much more 
complicated process involving new advances, combinations of old technologies, and, as 
suggested above, reaching back into the past to make new uses of technologies that 
acquire new relevance in light of some new advance.  “Percolation” and recombination 
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models of innovation attempt to incorporate the non -sequential character of innovation.108
Network analysis has the potential to provide tools for understanding this complexity 
because it provides metrics that are sensitive to multi-dimensional local structure.  
Indeed, social scientists Fleming and Sorenson and their collaborators have taken 
steps in this direction.109  They used patent citations in combination with the USPTO 
classification system to explore the way in which innovation proceeds as a process of 
search and recombination of prior technologies and to argue that successful innovation is 
a balance between re-using familiar components -- an approach that is more certain to 
succeed -- and combining elements that have rarely been used together -- an approach 
that is more likely to fail entirely, but also more likely to result in radical improvements.  
Podolny and Stuart and collaborators also made explicit use of social network 
analysis, using a basic network metric, the “transitivity,” to study the innovative 
process.110  Transitivity is a measure of local network structure.  It measures the 
likelihood that two nodes that are connected to a specific third node are also connected to 
one another.  Figure 12 illustrates this concept.  In the patent context, transitivity 
measures the likelihood that two patents that cite or are cited by the same patent also cite 
one another.
The network concept of “transitivity” is related to the suggestion in econometric 
studies of patent citations that patent importance should be related to a patent’s 
“generality,” which is defined in terms of the variety of USPTO classifications of the 
patents that cite it, and “originality,” which is defined in terms of the variety of USPTO 
108 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 73; Fleming and Sorenson, supra note73; Gerald Silverberg and Bart 
Verspagen, A Percolation Model of Innovation in Complex Technology Spaces, 29 J. ECON. DYNAMICS 
AND CONTROL 225 (2005).
109
 Fleming, supra note 73; Fleming and Sorenson, supra note 73.
110 See Podolny, Stuart and Hannan, supra note 105; Podolny and Stuart, supra note 105.
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classifications of the patents that it cites.111  Variations on transitivity provide potential 
alternative measures of “generality” and “originality” that should be less dependent on 
the ad hoc USPTO classification scheme.  (See Figure 12.)
Podolny and collaborators have used transitivity-type quantities to define local
measures of “competitive intensity” and “competitive crowding” based on indirect patent 
ties.112  A basic insight of their work is that if many innovations are building on the same 
technological antecedents and, thus contributing very similar technological outputs, the 
likelihood of a new entrant into the associated niche is lowered.  They used network 
transitivity measures to observe how a technological “niche” can become popular, but 
then overly crowded and “exhausted” as a result of a flurry of inventive activity in the 
niche.  They point out that counting the numbers of citations made or received is not 
sufficient to identify “crowded” niches -- an innovation that provides a technological 
foundation for a variety of unrelated advances will be highly cited without crowding.  
Indeed, as we have shown here in Part III, in the patent citation network the likelihood of 
further citation increases the more popular a patent becomes.  Podolny et al.  provide an 
interesting way to distinguish between highly cited patents.  Their work suggests that a 
patent that has been cited by a large number of patents which also cite one another (high 
transitivity) is less likely to be cited again than a patent that has been cited by a large 
number of patents which are not linked to one another.  Transitivity measures thus show 
promise as means to distinguish patents in “hot” fields from “important” patents.  
Studying the transitivity and other structural metrics that can be defined for 
networks can move the study of innovation using patent data beyond a focus on average 
111 See, e.g., Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, supra note 72.
112 See Podolny, Stuart and Hannan, supra note 105; Podolny and Stuart, supra note 105. 
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number of citations made and received to delve into the way in which inventions are 
combined, recombined, and re-used to produce new innovations.  As an example that 
builds on our work, we might investigate the extent to which delayed citations in the 
power law tail of the Al(l) function are made to patents with high “originality” (low 
transitivity) that connect disparate technologies. 
IV.C. Patent Thickets and Potential Anti-Competitive Licensing Practices
The proliferation of patents results in a situation in which many commercial 
products require the use of more than one -- and in some cases hundreds of -- patented 
technologies.  This situation raises a number of sometimes conflicting concerns.  On the 
one hand, there is the fear of a patent “thicket” in which the transaction costs associated 
with obtaining the necessary patent licenses to do something of practical usefulness 
become so high as to undermine the social value of the patents.113  There can even be a 
hold-up problem in which the owners of contributing technologies cannot come to an 
agreement at all, as a result of differing assessments of the relative value of various 
contributions to a commercial product.114  There are two distinct ways in which such a 
transaction costs nightmare could arise.  It might be that a commercial application 
requires many distinct and complementary patented technologies.  This could happen 
either as a result of increasing complexity in the technology itself or as a result of 
patenting more and “smaller”  pieces of technology space.  A need for many patent 
licenses might also be due to “patent blocking.”  Patent blocking occurs when a patent 
improves on the invention claimed in another patent in such a way that the claims of the 
earlier patent still cover the improved invention.  Where patent blocking occurs, licenses 
113 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 46; Bessen, supra note 59.
114 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 60.
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to a string of “nested” improvement patents may be required to use one particular 
technology.  In either case, one way to handle the necessary cross-licensing and cut down 
on transaction costs is for the owners of the relevant patents (who are often commercial 
entities in the same industry) to form “patent pools.”115
A high density of patents in a particular technological “niche” need not always 
indicate a patent thicket, however.  Closely related patented technologies may be 
potential substitutes for one another -- creating something more like patent supermarkets 
offering many nearly interchangeable options than patent thickets.  If these patents are 
separately owned, competition between patent holders will reduce licensing fees and the 
issue of hold-up will not arise.  In situations like this, in contrast to the patent thicket 
situation, patent pools and cross-licensing agreements between industry actors may be 
anti-c ompetitive.  Rather than serving to reduce transaction costs and avoid hold-up, such 
agreements may permit firms to avoid competing for licensing revenues and drive up 
royalties.  
Distinguishing between these two kinds of relationships between patents is of 
great theoretical and practical interest.  Citation network structural measures may be 
useful in addressing questions related to the patent thicket issue.  Prof. Gavin Clarkson 
has suggested that a high density of citations (meaning the fraction of possible citations 
that are actually made) in a particular patent neighborhood may suggest where patent 
pools might legitimately be formed.  Setting aside some technical issues about how to 
compare citation densities from different sized network samples, citation density is a 
useful way to assess the level of technological interrelatedness in a particular field.116
115 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 46; ; Goller, supra note 61.
116 Clarkson, supra note 6.
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Density alone cannot distinguish between patent thickets and patent supermarkets, 
however.  The mere existence of a citation from one patent to another cannot tell us 
which scenario is most likely.  Determining the meaning of a particular citation is an 
extremely labor-intensive process requiring understanding the legal and technical 
relationship between the citing and cited patents.  To investigate the existence of patent 
thickets and the potential for related antitrust problems, some structural metric that is 
sensitive to the character of a citation is highly desirable.  It may be possible to design 
such a metric based on transitivity concepts.
Podolny and Stuart note that a technological tie (and hence a likelihood of a 
citation) exists between two patents if “the contribution of [the second] incorporates, 
builds on, or is bounded by a technological contribution of [the first.]”117  The distinction 
between these relationship types is critical to understanding the extent to which increased 
patenting in a particular area signifies patent blocking and high-transaction-cost thickets 
or desirable designing around and competition.  
As we alluded to above, patents may cite an earlier patent because they build on 
its technology (what one commentator has termed “lovely” citations) or because they 
replace or distinguish its technology (“dangerous” citations).118  Depending on the scope 
of a patent’s claims, a “lovely” citation may mean that use of the later technology must 
be authorized by the owners of both patents.  A “dangerous” citation, on the other hand, 
may mean that a prospective user of the related technologies can play them off against 
one another in bargaining for a license.  The existence of “lovely” and “dangerous” 
117
 Podolny  and Stuart, supra note 105.
118
 Maurseth, supra note 73.
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citations is thus related to the potential for patent thickets and for antitrust problems when 
industry competitors sign cross-licenses or form “patent pools.”
We suggest that a patent C that cites a patent B which makes a “lovely” citation to 
an earlier patent A is relatively likely to cite the earlier patent as well.  (See Figure 5c.) 
This is because for a “lovely” citation, the claims of A are likely to be broader in scope 
than the claims of B, and patent C must therefore be distinguished from both A and B to 
be patentable.  If the citation is “dangerous,” on the other hand, patent C may not need to 
be distinguished from patent A.  Thus, on average, we would expect a group of patents in 
a high-transaction cost “thicket” to have a higher value of the variant of transitivity 
illustrated in Fig. 5c.  We plan to investigate whether the Fig. 5c transitivity will provide 
insight into the extent to which patents in a given technical field tend to be competing 
substitutes or “blocking patent” complements.  If we are successful in identifying a 
structural measure of this kind, it may be both of analytical use in understanding the 
prevalence of blocking patents in particular technical fields and of practical use in 
evaluating the potential anti-competitive effects of patent pools and cross-licensing 
agreements.
IV.D. Understanding Citation Practice
For the most part, we advocate the usefulness of patent citations as signifiers of 
technological relationship.  We have intentionally avoided questions that require a 
“thick” interpretation of citations between patents (such as the assumption that a citation 
indicates a flow of knowledge between inventors).  However, because it has recently 
become possible to distinguish citations made by inventors from those made by patent 
applicants (and their attorneys), network analysis may find use in developing a more 
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nuanced understanding of citation practice as well.  Of course, the better we understand 
what citations mean the more useful they will be in studies of patent policy and 
innovation. 
We have not yet attempted to investigate whether there are interesting differences 
in citation patterns between citations originating with examiners and patentees.  In part, 
this is because the distinction between examiner and patentee citations was not available 
in computationally accessible format for the patents in the dataset we have used so far.  
However, we do have some results that raise interesting questions about citation practice.  
We have studied the frequency with which the patents in the dataset cited a given number 
of prior patents.  The resulting graph of the fraction of patents making a particular 
number of citations is shown in Figure 13.  It reveals something surprising.  
The distribution of citations made by patents is highly skewed and has a long tail, 
much like the similar graph for the number of citations received (see Figure 1).  This 
distribution is not what we intuitively expected.  It is not surprising that the graph of the 
fraction of patents receiving a given number of citations is broad and skewed.  
Preferential attachment explains this, as discussed in Part III.  The skewed, slowly 
decaying distribution for the number of citations made by patents in Figure 13 cannot be 
explained by preferential attachment, however.  Citations are made by the patent 
examiner and patent applicant (or the applicant’s attorney) in one fell swoop during 
prosecution.  Indeed, one might guess that the number of citations made in a given patent 
would be constrained by the cost of searching for and adding additional citations.  The 
distribution of the number of citations made would then be likely to be more or less a 
normal distribution, centered about some typical value (related to the typical investment 
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in searching) with relatively small deviations from the norm.  Indeed, though studies of 
citations in scientific journal articles have paid little attention to the distribution of 
citations made, such reported work as there is concludes that the distribution of citations 
made in those journals is exponentially peaked around a “typical” value, just as one 
might have expected.119
The measured results for the distribution of number of citations made by patents 
do not conform to this naïve expectation.  We do not yet have a satisfactory explanation 
for this intriguing result, though we have explored a few possibilities.  One possibility is 
that larger numbers of citations made reflect greater investments by patentees into patents 
that are expected to be more valuable.120  But many patent citations are made not by 
patentees, but by patent examiners, who would not necessarily have direct incentives to 
invest more in examining more valuable patents.  An alternative hypothesis for the broad 
spread in the number of citations made is that larger entities might invest more resources 
in “bulletproofing” their patents against potential invalidity challenges.  Upon further 
investigation, however we found no strong correlation between owning more patents and 
making more citations.  Another possibility is that the broad, skewed distribution results 
from the fact that patent applicants and examiners often employ a recursive search 
approach (looking at a related patent and then following citation “links” from that patent 
to find other relevant patents). 121  Research scientists presumably search the scientific 
literature recursively also, however, and the distribution of citations made in scientific 
119
 Alexei Vazquez, Citations Networks, available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/cond-
mat/pdf/0105/0105031.pdf (2001).
120
 Some correlation has been found between patent value -- which does have a broad, skewed distribution -
- and number of citations made.  See, e.g., references cited at note 47.  However, these correlations are 
fairly weak.  
121 Jure Leskovec, Jon Kleinberg, and Christos Faloutsos Graphs over Time: Densification Laws, Shrinking 
Diameters and Possible Explanations, KDD’05, ACM (2005).
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papers apparently has the expected exponentially peaked form.  If more definitive studies 
bear this out, the differences in distribution of citations made between patents and 
scientific journals may reflect an interesting difference between patent and scientific 
journal citation processes.  Understanding the reasons for these differences may help to 
interpret the meaning of patent citations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This Article began by arguing that network science is poised to begin making 
important contributions to legal scholarship by offering relevant concepts, empirical 
methods, and modeling techniques that will be better able than current approaches to 
account for the importance of heterogeneity and local network structure in determining 
collective behavior.  Because networks are ubiquitous in the social problems to which the 
law is addressed, network science, we argued, may make a significant contribution to 
legal analysis.  Network science is particularly promising for dealing with situations in 
which local relationships are important and heterogeneous.  It provides means to 
illuminate the complicated relationship between local relationship patterns and structure 
and interactions and global, collective behavior.
In the second half of this Article, we illustrated how the network approach can be 
applied to study the patent citation network.  In Part III we showed empirically that, not 
only has the number of patents been increasing rapidly in recent years, but citation 
patterns have been changing as well.  The average “citability” of a patent increases very 
rapidly with the number of times it has already been cited, demonstrating the 
“preferential attachment” or “rich get richer” phenomenon observed in many complex 
networks.  Moreover, the extent to which highly cited patents are more “citable” than less 
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cited patents has changed over time.  Citability has become more stratified since the early 
1990s.  Since citability is likely related to a patent’s technical importance, the increasing 
stratification suggests that the patentability standard may have decreased, resulting in the 
issuance of a larger fraction of more trivial patents.  Neither a general increase in the pace 
of technological progress, nor a general broadening of patented technology seems to 
explain the increasing stratification of patent citability.  In fact, the average number of 
citations made by a patent has increased over time, suggesting that patents inhabit a more 
and more densely crowded technological space on average.  
The increasing stratification began in the early 1990s, a period which has no 
obvious connection with the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, or with the rise 
in biotechnology, software, or business methods patenting, but is around the time that the 
“suggestion or motivation to combine” test for determining whether a claimed invention 
is obvious became established as the definitive Federal Circuit approach.122  One possible 
hypothesis, based on our study so far, is that a weakening of the non-obviousness 
requirement, perhaps associated with the “suggestion test,” has given rise to a 
proliferation of patents on minor improvements over the prior art which typically have 
little impact on the development of the technology and are thus cited only for a brief 
period after issuance.  We cannot rule out other explanations for the change in the pattern 
of citation network evolution, however.
122 See, e.g., ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“suggestion or incentive”); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“teaching, suggestion or 
incentive”); In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“reason, suggestion, or motivation”); and 
In re Raynes, 7 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“teaching, suggestion or motivation”).  While the 
“suggestion test” was first applied by the Federal Circuit around 1983, when it began issuing opinions, the 
number of cases in which it was applied increased dramatically between 1990 and 2000.  An informal 
survey of Federal Circuit case law finds more than three times as many cases citing the suggestion test in 
2000 as in 1990.  (See Figure 11.)
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In Part IV we reported some preliminary results of other network-based 
approaches to understanding the patent system.  We suggested that the concept of 
network path length or “distance” may be a fruitful means to explore the connections 
between different technical “fields.”  A network measure of “technological distance” 
could be used to evaluate the USPTO classification scheme and as an alternative and 
more quantitative way to classify patents and to evaluate concepts such as the patent law 
concept of “analogous arts” that determines the prior art which is considered in assessing 
non-obviousness.
We next discussed how network-based analysis may be useful in studying the 
innovative process.  For example, consistent with earlier statistical studies of citation 
lags, we found that the probability that a patent will be cited peaks at a relatively “young” 
patent age.  But the citation probability also has a long, slow power law decay at older 
ages, suggesting that some patents retain their influence over very long times.123
Surprisingly, this persistent vitality of some older patents is seen even for patents which 
have received few or no citations -- thus even “unpopular” patents have a significant 
probability of being revived after a long period of dormancy.  This complicated 
dependence on patent age is evidence of the highly nonlinear nature of innovation and 
suggests that there may be two different innovation “types” -- incremental innovation, for 
which the standard models of patents as incentives to investment may be relevant, and 
unpredictable innovation, which may be less susceptible to a simple incentive theory and 
more in line with “percolation” models of invention, in which incremental progress is 
123
 This long tail in the probability of citation as a function of patent age is masked to some extent by the 
rapidly increasing number of younger patents in earlier studies which simply compute average distributions 
of citation lags.  Our dynamic analysis disentangles these two effects.
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coupled with complicated linkages back to previous technology.124  Further work will 
explore this distinction in more detail, in part by investigating the qualitative nature of the 
long-lived and “reborn” patents.  
Social scientists have begun to apply social-network-based approaches, looking at 
local network structure, to validate theories of innovation based on concepts of search 
and recombination.  It should be possible to incorporate and build upon these studies in 
the analysis of innovation policy from a legal perspective.
Another area in which a network approach shows promise is the evaluation of the 
extent to which increased patenting is related to the emergence of patent thickets and 
blocking patents.  Network-based measures of local structure may be able to distinguish 
on average between patent thickets and areas of patenting of competing technologies.  
This approach may even be helpful in distinguishing between socially valuable patent 
pools and anti-competitive cross-licensing arrangements.
Finally, it may be possible to use network methods to study citation practices and, 
in particular, to compare citation practice in scientific journals and patents.  
Understanding citation practice should improve our ability to use citations to study both 
the patent system and innovation more generally.
In this Article we have provided only a small sample of the application of network 
science to legal problems.  Much remains to be done in applying network science to the 
patent system and to other legal issues.
124
 Silverberg, supra note 109.
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Figure 1:  Distributions of number of citations received for the patent citation network at 
various times, shown on a log-log plot.  A scale-free, power law distribution would be a 
straight line on this plot.  Note that here the curvature increases as the network grows 
larger, inconsistent with the predictions of pure preferential attachment and consistent 
with the effects of patent aging.
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Figure 2:  The degree distribution for a random network.  The shape is a Poisson 
distribution.
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Figure 3:  This figure illustrates the “normal” distribution or “Bell curve” that 
characterizes many probability distributions.  It is symmetric, strongly peaked, and has a 
well-defined mean and median which are equal to one another.  The probability outside 
of a few standard deviations from the mean is very small.
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Figure 4:  Top:  This figure illustrates power law or “scale-free” probability distributions 
of node degree for two values of the decay exponent.  Unlike the normal distribution, 
these distributions are highly skewed and cannot be meaningfully characterized by a 
“typical” value.  Depending upon the decay exponent, the mean and median values can 
be quite far from one another.  Indeed, if the decay exponent is small enough, the mean 
(or average) value is infinite even though the most likely value is zero.  The standard 
deviation is infinite for both of the exponent values shown.  Bottom:  The same 
distributions are shown on a “log-log” plot, in which power law distributions are straight 
lines.
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Figure 6:  Top:  Number of patents issued and applications filed per year as a function of 
time on a linear scale.  Bottom:  Number of patents issued and applications filed per year 
on a semi-log scale where linear portions correspond to exponential growth.
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Figure 9:  Top:  A(k,l) as a function of patent age l, in units of patent number, for various 
values of in-degree, k.  Bottom:  The decaying portion of Al(l) as a function of patent age 
l, for various values of k.
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Figure 10:  Stratification parameter, , as a function of time.
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Figure 11:  Fraction of Federal Circuit cases involving obviousness that referred to the 
“suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine” test as a function of time.  These 
numbers were obtained using LEXIS searches for  “(suggestion or motivation or 
teaching) w/s combine” (to count references to the suggestion test) and either a reference 
to “obvious” in the headnotes (dashes) or at least 5 uses of the word “obvious” in the case 
(diamonds).  These two methods of counting yield the same qualitative results showing 
an increase in use of the suggestion test in the late 1990s.
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                                 (a)
                                (b)
                               (c)
 Figure 12:  Illustrations of definitions of transitivity relevant to (a) generality; (b) 
originality; (c) whether citation from B to C likely indicates a “design around” or a 
blocking patent
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Figure 13:  The out-degree distribution of the patent citation network at various times, 
showing the evolution toward a power law (scale free) behavior as the network grows.  
This behavior contrasts with the increasing curvature of the in-degree distribution over 
time.
